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PieinteFaction Expectancy Effects and Stereotypes: Impacts in a Clinical Context (125 pp.) 
Director: Frances Hill
The prerent research is conqx>sedoftwo studies, both ofwdiich examine the role of 
preinteraction expectancies and stereotypes in the social evaluation of persons seeking 
mental health treatment. A preliminary literature review first outlines basic concepts such 
as labels, stereotypes, expectancy efbcts, and stigma, and then presents a syn<^is of 
labeling theory. Historical views ofmental illness are also biiefty addressed. Next, the 
review summarizes the scant information availaWe r%arding social judgments of those 
vho sedc mental health treatment but who would not otherwise be considered mentally ill.
Both studies address this latter group. Study 1 explwes the content and valence of 
staeotypes which apply to psychotherapy recipients. Study 2 e>q>lores the extent to vhich 
medical terminology infhiences the scope and/or extremity of the social stereotypes as 
dejSned in Stucty 1. Research subjects were drawn hmn uncfergraduate college courses and 
were largely young (undor age 25), female, and Eun^)ean-American, finom middle class, 
nirat back^ounds. All subjects answered a series of four questionnaiies selected to 
provide cmiverging data relevant to the research questions.
The results of both studies were consistent. Subjects (xovided ample data regarding 
stereotypes of people vho obtain, or vho are referred for, mental health services. In 
general, the stereotyped mqxectancies of people seeing a psychologist were uniform^ 
negative, and differed significantly finom thcoe fm the control groiq> of persons vho had an 
appointment Wth a fomily physician. The manipulated wuiable in Stmty 2—the degree of 
medical terminology—had no impact on the consequent stereotypes. The argument is made 
that, at least among this groiq> of subjects, the stigma attached to mental health treatment is 
still so intense that it ovoiides all other variables.
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CHAPTER ONE:
LITERATURE RE VIEW
A tkortpêntm among pygmù* mc^têom ta bê aĝ œU (Ramhan, 1975, p. 463).
A grta t deal oor̂ vaiam arises ithen pecple deekne ta ekas^  dmnseh/es as w» hate cfauaÿW àiem.
Prcphesywauldbe sa mueheasier ̂ onfy duywauldstevedmrewe putdum (üppmatm, 1922, p.
151).
IntroducticMX
Eight nomud confedefates prescaat thonselves for voluntaiy admission to 12 
dififereint psydiiatric hosfntals. Tlie confederates give correct and honest answers to ail 
questions, with the exception of a single (feke(Q symptom: vague auditory hallucinations 
composed <m]y of the words, "thud,” "hollow,” and "empty.” On all 12 occasions, the 
confederates are admitted to the hoq)ital. Eleven receive a diagnosis of schizophrenia; one 
is ^emed manic-depressive. The confedoates are kept in foe hospital for stays ranging 
from seven to 52 days. They are then evmtually disduuged, all with the label of mental 
illness still intact despite prolonged periods of perfect^ normal behavior subject to 
trained, professional observation.
Rosenhan s (1973,1975) now-infemous stutfy, "On Being Sane in Insane Places,” 
generated a storm of fury and of controversy, but no one could dispute its basic result: an 
overvfoelming, 100% diagnostic feilure rate. It was an astounding finding, and (me vfoirfo 
emphasized not only the potential for professional error in the difficult arena of 
interpersonal evahiaticm, but also the d^ree to vdnch such professionally-applied labels 
can shape lives. Rosenhan (1975) challenged his clinical audience to consider the 
difference betwecm descriptions of two people with id^tically n<Hmal behavior. Are the
S
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chamctenzaüons syimymous, he asked, whm oiie pefson is caUed 
paranoid sdnznphnmic, in Rxmssion?
The (pesdon, of course, was k ige^  rhetorical; bowevar, recent research has 
underscored the point. Once a suggestion ofmental disorder is made, the label activates a 
cascade of cognitive WerperannAl, and social processes. The subsequent bdiaviors of 
persons so labeled are often interpreted against a backdrop of devaluation in a troubling 
process idnchftie clinical field is still struggling to imdersiand.
Part of the problem vdrich has so beleaguered chnical research into this area is its 
very complexity. At issue are questions concerning the iiature ofWerpersonal 
relati(Xiship8, of human cognitive and emotional ftmcti<ming, of social and cultutal 
indoctrinatioo, and of clinical trahûng relative to the therapeutic milieu. At best, any one 
stucty can onty focus on a small aspect of the vhole and then hcpe that overlapping data 
will slowty illuminate the mechanisms involved in the proc^(es) ofmtaqrersooal 
assessment.
The current pair of studies will focus on the expectancies which precede the 
thaapeutic «rcountar. Evm narrowed to this single aspect, however, this research 
represents the concqrtual int%ration of a wide range of historically insular bodies of 
literature, both eaqwimental and clinical. From within the %q>erimental dmnain ccanes 
researdi related to judgment heuristics and biases; expectancy efifects; attentional 
processes; person perception; attribution theory and labeling theories; identity negotiation 
processes including behavioral confirmation and self-fulfilling prqhecies; and 
staeotyping. From within the clinical tradition, relevant past research includes attitudes
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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toward the mental^ ill; the effects of stigma; mterposoDal power dynamics; the influences 
of referral data; flie interactioos between diagnoses, medical model terminology, and client 
outcome; and bairim  to treatment.
These lists are not conqplete. They are ofliaed mtat\y to indicate that the following 
prt^xxral represents a broad synthesis of different terminologies, concqitual approaches, 
and research paradigms. The way can seem confusing at times but, in the broadest sau«, 
the focus will always be upon the treatment milieu, and data will be presented in the 
context of its significance for clinical practice.
More qpecificalfy, the following review will b%in with a discussion of areas of 
potential difficulty betwera all tha:^>i8ts and their clients, given the wuiety of cultural, 
inteip^onal, and professional pressures involved in that particular relaticmsbip. The 
in9 X)rt and potential inqxictoftttts research wUl be addressed in that (xxktext Next, the 
research foundati<ai for the current wc»k will be outlined, starting wifli such basic concepts 
as the definitimis of labels and stereotypes. This will be followed by an overvkw of 
relevant theory and will continue with a more specific theoretical anal̂ mis of 
preinteractim expectancy effects.
After summariziog this rather wide-ranging tour, the review will then narrow to a 
(XMQsidetation of mental illness as a particular label with particular effects, both historical 
and contemporary. Also included will be a brief discussion of the role of stigma. Finally, 
an even smaller subset of data will be examined vhidi relates to those labeled persons 
vdio are apparmtly ”ül,** in that they are seeldrig psychological treatment, but vdio are not 
"mentally ill” as the term is usualfy understood.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Hiis latter is the aiea of greatest mterest, toward which the current research is 
specifically targeted. It is the area fo ri^ c h  the entirety of presented psycholc^cal 
subspecialtiM are poignantly and inqpcrtantly relevant, but toward vhich none has y^ to be 
applied in any systematic tesMon. The first study, then, will eiqplore the presmce of social 
stereotypes associated with those who seek psychological treatment, and will define the 
conteot of those stereotypes if such exist. The conqwnian research will consider whether, 
or to what degree, medical model terminol<%y functions as a stimulus in eliciting 
stereotyped expectations.
Labels and Stereotypes;
Defimti<nis in a Clinical Context
...àt» 'Words so acquirsd or* ths eu» far a y^tok train o f idsas on -which ubmatefy... untold 
oemstqumc»» may h» bas»d (Zjppmann, 1922, p. 68).
Rosenhan’s (1973,1975) wodc, cited above, has been harshly criticized for its 
unflattering p a r tia l of clinical practitioners. And indeed, among groups who stigmatize 
the mentally ill, mental healfli practitioners themselves are often named (Bentley, Harrison, 
&Hhdson, 1993; Burk & Sher, 1990; Farina, 1981; Goldin; 1990; Hamilton, 1993; 
Mansouci & Dowell, 1989; Millon, 1975; NAPS/News, 1989; Positive Visibility, 1989; 
NARPA, 1989; Rosenhan, 1973; Simmons, 1992; "Stigma,’’ 1994; Stnqpp, 1989). That 
perspective, «Ithoiigh distressing, is nonetheless crucial to arty examination of the 
therapeutic relationship. Questions conceming the reciprocal and interactive effects of 
labeling are at the very heart of psychological practice, since the percqxtion of a patient w 
client "is a major firctor in determining the quality and quantity o f... care [professionals]... 
will render’* (Wallston, Wallstoo, & DeVellis, 1976, p. 663; also Burk & Sher, 1990;
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Goldin, 1990;Hanis, 1994;NfiUoD, 1975;Rnbkin, 1972; Rosenhan, 1975; Simmons, 1992; 
Wills, 1978).
it is in no way a condernnaticm o i mental health professionals to cmsider their 
role as contributors in the processes under consideration. On the contrary, in his study 
Roaaihan (1973) wrote that "our overwhelming impression... was of people who really 
cared, who w«e committed, and who were nmcommonly intelligent" (p. 257).
Nevertheless, sevesal fectois (xmspire to introduce potentially damaging biases into the 
practices of even the most scrupulous. At issue are not the individuals themselves, but "the 
role of context” (Rosenhan, 1975, p. 463) in i^ c h  those individuals necessarify function. 
Clinicians are, first of all, trained to make rapid interpersonal assessments, both formal 
and informal; and, second, they are immersed in a paradigm winch relies heavify on 
medical terminology. Consequmt^, they are subject to the limitations of various judgment 
heuristics and cognitive strategies demanded by such a working milieu OSudc, 1992; 
Caplan, 1992; Fiske & N eu b ^ , 1990; Gauron & Dickinsw, 1969; Goldin, 1990; 
Retzinger, 1990; Rosenhan, 1973; Sandifer, Hordern, & Green, 1970; Wills, 1978).
All of these firctors may ccmtribute to processes Wndh unintentionally isolate or 
devalue entire groups of people whom psychologists have intended to help (Coyne, 
Sherman, & O’Brien, 1978; Dickie, 1982; F%ree & Smith, 1979; Goldin, 1990; Hamilton, 
1993; Mfflon, 1975; Patterson & Witten, 1987; RaWdn, 1972; Wills, 1978; Witztum, 
Margolin, Bar-on, & Levy, 1992). "Facile yet immutable diagnostic judgments” (Millon, 
1975, p. 456) may be made on the basis of questionable behavioral data, with sometimes 
t r ^ c  results (Burk & Sher, 1990; Darley & Fazio, 1980; MUlcm, 1975; Simmons, 1992;
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Witztum et al., 1992). And the culprit, according to MUlon (1975), is ”tt^ impact of 
clinical habits and esqpectations” (p. 458).
Hie influenoe of these cognitive habits was painfully illustrated in another earfy, 
and now classic, studÿ (Latter & Abelson, 1974). Therapists weie asked to evaluate a 
man being interviewed on videotape. Halfwere told he was a job applicant; the other half 
were told he was a psychotherapy patient. The results showed a clear divergence of 
opinion. Many of those in the job-^>plicant condition described the man as "faufy reality- 
oriented” and as an "upstanding, middle-class-dtizen.” Those who saw the some man, but 
with the connotation of mental illness imbued by a "patient” label, now described him as 
hostile, defensive, passive-^gcessive, anxious, cWlicted, and unrealistic.
The label of "patient” or "job applicant” -vhich in this case preceded any direct 
eqiosure to the person being evaluated—apparently created an expectancy, vhich then 
gnided clinicians* assessment and intapretation of the data before them. Many such labels 
in the clinical siting are infinmal; most often, they consist of personality descriptors or 
assessments of responsibility, treatability, smtabihty for various roles, and so on. Nearly 
all of the evaluative comments offered by the clinicians in Langer & Abelson’s (1974) 
study were informai labels. On ftie oth^ hand, diagnoses ate labels whidi are fonnalfy 
recognized as such, both ptofessiraially and culturally.
While labeling undeniably has some benefits (Allport & Odbert, 1936; Bentley et 
al., 1993; Burk & Sher, 1990; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Harris, 1994; Link, Cullen, Frank, 
& Wozniak, 1987), its less-than-cautious use poses a number of dangers. Most obvious is 
that such terms cannot be sqxarated fimn their affective and evaluative connotations (Asch,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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1946; BeoÜey et al., 1993; Bwk & Sher, 1990; Fiake & Neubefg, 1990; Fiske & Ruscher, 
1993; Hamilton, 1993; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987; Simmons, 1992; Strupp, 1989; Wills, 
1978; Wyer & Lambert, 1994). To label is to jud^e; the label serves as a sort of shorthand 
for an array of fiacts, nptniona  ̂beliefs  ̂desmptions. and expectations about others.
Because nf thi« MvmpnMaian of infottnation-part feet, part fency-labels can rather easily
elidt oonylex cognitive sets known as stereotypes <Butk A Shear, 1990; Didde, 1982; 
Fiake & Neuberg, 1990; Hamilton, Stroessner, & Driscoll, 1994; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987; 
Simmons, 1992).
Stereotypes are one of the most global forms of intapemonal analysis (DarlQr & 
Fazio, 1980; Darley & Gross, 1983; Fiske, 1993; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Jussim, 1986; 
Zarate & Smith, 1990). T h^ are afeo cultural in wigin; they are simply absorbed, more w 
less, via the socialization process. People wfao have had no contact whatsoever with a 
particular groiq> nevertheless can often describe the prevailing stereotype (Karims, 
Coffinan, & Walters, 1969; Link, Cullen, Strueoing, Sfarout, & Dohrenwend, 1989; Link, 
Mixotznik, & Cullen, 1991; Lippmann, 1922).
Lqqpmann (1922), who first popularized the term immediately following World 
War I, equated stereotypes with "the pictures in our heads" (p. 3 ff). He noted their 
complex psydiological fimction as an ordering heuristic, where "pe<^le and thirds have 
their well-known places, and do certain expected things.... There we find the drarm of the 
femiUar, the normal, the dependable...” (p. 95). More recent researchers have tried to 
refine such a global construct; many use a trichotomous conceptuahzatirm. In this view, 
stateotyrang is predominantly a cognitive process, as distinguished from prejudice, vhidi
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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oocius OQ the affective dimtiisioii, and from diaciitninatioai, which is a behaviofal 
exptession (Fiake, 1993). In other words, the stereotype is inevitably aitwmed wifli 
emotional response (i.e., prejudice) and attitudinal, vghal, or othar behavÎOTal expression 
(i.e., discnmination), but it is distinct from those responses or expressions (Cauthen, 
RobinscMi & Kmuss, 1977; Farina, 1981; Jones & Cochrane, 1981; Karlins et al., 1969; 
Pin* & Kahle, 1984; RaWdn, 1972; Tiachiehbeig, 1986).
A stereotype, once called to mind by a sinyle linguistic cue such as a label, thai 
generates further expectancies (Bulk & Sher, 1990; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Hamilton et 
al., 1994; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987; Rabkin, 1972). Since many such expectancies are about 
intangible qualities like penxmality attributes, they can be exceedingty difScult to 
disconfinn (Darky & Gross, 1983; Dickie, 1982; Link et aL, 1991; Neuberg, 1989; 
Rolhbeit & Paik, 1986; Simmons, 1992; Swann, 1984; Swann & Ety, 1984; Temerlin, 
1968). In fact, in any intecp*sooal int*action, ev*i the search for information itself is a 
process of interpretation. Thus, a therapist responding to a label with stereotyped 
expectation» may attend nuxe readily to crxifiimatoiy data, i^lectivety recall past evidence 
of confinnation, overestimate the number of such instances, and reinterpret or reconstruct 
data. Expectancy-cfmsistent information may also be weighted more heavily in any final 
evaluation (B*itley et al., 1993; Burk & Sher, 1990; Darley & Fazio, 1980; Darley & 
Gross, 1983; Davies & Morris, 1989-90; Farina, 1981; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Ford & 
Stangor, 1992; Fumham & Schofield, 1987; Gauron & Dickinson, 1969; Hamilton, 1993; 
Hamilton et a l, 1994; Jussim, 1986; Katz & Braly, 1933; Lippmann, 1922; Mfeitin, 1987; 
Millon, 1975; Neubag, 1989; Poole, Regoli, & Pcgrehin, 1986; Retzinger, 1990;
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Roaenhan, 1973; Snyder & Uninowttz, 1978; Stnqip, 1989; Teoaerlin, 1968; Wills, 1978; 
Zawaddd, 1988). The resultant intapersooal processes can be pownful enou^ to "fit” 
the target to the expectation (Buik & Sher, 1990; Darley & Fazio, 1980; Denton, 1989; 
Didde, 1982; Hamilton et al., 1994; Harris, 1994; Link et al., 1989; McLocg & Taub,
1987; Millon, 1975; S tn ^ , 1989; Swann & Ely, 1984; Warner, Taylor, Powers, & 
Hyman, 1989; Witztum et al., 1992; Wyer & Lambert, 1994).
This may be especially true in clinical psychology. Even the sanest human 
behaviw is notorious^ (xm^lex, and ambiguous evidaice, by its very nature, presents 
little challenge to an eiq)ectanGy (Buik & l^ier, 1990; Darley & Fazio, 1980; Farina, 1981; 
Fiske & Neub«g, 1990; Gauron & Dickinson, 1969; Hamilton et aL, 1994; Jussim, 1986; 
Millon, 1975; Neuberg, 1989; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987; Rosenhan, 1975). How much more 
difficult does the interpretatiw and evaluation ofbehaviw become, then, in clinical 
settings inhere clients regularly offer information that may be "disorganized, fragmentary, 
amWguous,... inconsistent, «motkm-ladkn, cryptic, symbolic, and defeosive** (Waxman, 
Rapagna, & Dumont, 1991)7 In addition, because people who mter therapy often do so 
out of uncertainty about themselves, then^pists may often find clients willing to offer 
expectancy-consistent evidence, even if these expectancies were initially false (Darley & 
Fazio, 1980; Fumham & Schofield, 1987; Jussim, 1986; Swann, 1984; Swann & Ely, 
1984).
Labeling TWoiy
As just noted, a label can be high^ inflnentifll in understanding, interpreting, and 
molding others' behavior. Often a label may have its primary inq>act via larger group
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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processes wiiidi reflect, maintaip, or even encourage stoeotyping (Coyne et al., 1978; 
Didde, 1982; Feroee & Smith, 1979; Longmore, 1985; Millon, 1975; Neubeg & Fiske, 
1987; Patters<m & Wittwi, 1987; Simmons, 1992; Witztum et al., 1992). Patterson & 
Witten (1987) have even defined "disabling lai%uage," in part, as that vdùch perpetuates 
niyths and stereotypes (p. 245). Ibe distillation of con^lex realities to uncomplicated 
cat^ories reflects one of the axioms of taxonomic research, namely, that "the mote 
inqxntant... a [social] difBaence, the mote likely is it to become expressed as a single 
word” (John, Angleitn»-, & Ostend<»f, 1988, p. 174). It is the very sinogplicity of a label, 
its name-tag-Uke brevity, vdiich is also indicative of its personal and cultural salience.
Eaxfy labeling tbeœy, 'Miich originally proposed that labels elicited w mcouraged 
stereotyping, was eventually eiqpanded from that position to prqpose that a negative label 
actually caused the problems it purported to name. The theory suggested that im 
unflrvwable label constrained individuals to adopt the social roles so defined. Thus, a 
person who acquired a label of mental illness, only became mentalfy ill after internalizing
the negative and inescapable soçjefatl Asmandg inhcrant inthat label (Doherty, 1975; Jones 
& Cochrane, 1981; Link et al., 1989; Link et al., 1991; Mansouri & Dowell, 1989; 
Nusbaumer, 1983; Warner, Taylor, Powers, & Hyman, 1989).
A research paradigm gradually emerged wfaidi attempted to isdate the influence of 
labeling. The usual procedure was to provide subjects with a brief history or personality 
description, altern% merefy a single word or label in each of the conditions vhile holding
all otho’data ccmstant. Studies have used this, or a similar, procedure to demonstrate the
influence of diagnostic labels (Langer & Abelson 1974; Socall & Holtgraves, 1992;
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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WalistoQ et al., 1976); academic labels (Salvia, Claik, & Ysselc^e, 1973; Yssddyte & 
Algosszine, 1981); and sodoecooomic class labels (Barley & Gross, 1983), among others. 
The data do indteed indicate that labels have powerful social and interpersonal
V  .A{
efiPects: the phenomenon is robust and almost commoa-saisical. Howavo*, the influence of 
a label is highly variable (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987; Finer & Kahle, 
1984; Poole d  al., 1986; Rothbart & Park, 1S%6; Temerlin, 1968) and other researdiers 
continued to insist that it was the behavior of labeled persmis whidi evoked a n a tiv e  
reaction, rather than the label itself (Jones & Codhrane, 1981; Link d  al., 1989; Link d  al., 
1991; Mansouri & Dowell, 1989; Warner et al., 1989). Eventually research stalled, as 
investigates squabbled ove whether labels produced bdiavie , or bd&aviw, labels.
Perhaps due to the ultimate impasse betwemi Hhe two polari2sed perspectives, or to 
the d^rae of passion with Wiich each side studc to its own positicm, labeling theory itself 
was not reevaluated until the late 1980’s. At that time, a new and more balanced 
perspective «naged, which has been christened modified labeling theay (Link et al., 
1989; Link et al., 1991; Socall & Holtgraves, 1992). The modified theory posits an 
mteraction between the stigma of the label, societal reaction, and the individual’s coping 
strategies. A label alone is now rarely considered sufficient to create illness. However, 
once a pason has been ill, an unsupportive or stigmatizir% social environnent acts to
thwart the person’s escape from that role, and thus, his or her recovery. Problematic social 
responses ««n include job or housing discrimination, social diatmncinĝ  and devaluation 
(Denton, 1989; Fabr%a, 1990; Farina, 1981; Flynn, 1987; Link et aL, 1989; Link et al., 
1991; McLorg & Taub, 1987; Mansouri & Dowell, 1989; Millon, 1975; Mound &
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Butterill, 1978; Nusbaumer, 19483; Pioer & Kahle, 1984; PtesUm & Smith, 1985; RaWdn, 
1972; Relzmger, 1990; Socall & Holgraves, 1992; "Stigma,” 1994; Trachtenberg, 1986; 
Witztum et al., 1992).
Once diagnosed, persons may also find themselves at a disadvantage for custody 
healings, other legal proceedings, and insurability (Dentmi, 1989; Fabiega, 1990; Flynn, 
1987; Levinson, 1994; Retzinger, 1990; Rosenhan, 1973; Witztum ̂  al., 1992). Those 
leactions promote self-devaluation in the labeled person, as well as e3q>ectatiQns of further 
cbWuation by others, all of increase vulnerabili^ to further psydiological distress 
(Denton, 1989; Fabrega, 1990; Farina, 1981; Ffynn, 1987; Link et al., 1989; Link et al., 
1991; Mansouri & Dowell, 1989; Millon, 1975; Finer & Kahle, 1984; Poole et al., 1986; 
Preston & Smith, 1985; Socall & Holgraves, 1992; Trachtenberg, 1986; Warner et al., 
1989; Witztum et a l, 1992).
The modified theoiy em^Aasizes that the struggle to escape a negatively-labeled 
role can be prc4(mged and taxing, and that the party with the fewer resources is most likefy 
to capitulate, even unwillingly (Fiske & Ruscher, 1993; Link et al., 1991). In fact, a 
stigmatizing label "so fully complicates people's lives that onfy the excepticmally shrewd
or fortunate escape its deletmous effects. Accardingty,'when individuals try to overcome 
the stigmatizing elBFect of a label , ... their attenq>ts are likely to fail” (Link et al., 1991, p. 
303).
Link et al. (1991) ccHxpued outcomes for those treated within the mental l^alth 
system (ofiBcialty labeler^, those with quantifiable psychopathology but no treatment (no 
label, but discadered behavior), and those with no evidence of pathology and no label (no
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label, no unuaual bebavioir). The investigatcns noted that the pfesence of an official label 
was moce strongly correlated with expenœces of devaluation and discrimination, with a 
concomitant pooona’ prc^nosis, than was the degree of actual impairment.
Evesx more interesting, in posons with high levels of disturbance but no label, thoe 
was no relationship between those persons' expectations of social devaluation or 
discrimination for the mentalfy iU and their own (personal) outcome variables such as 
subjective feelings of demoralization, unemployment or underen^loymmt, or restricted 
suppôt systems (Unk et al., 1991). Those respoidoxts with in^paired behavior but no 
label apparently did not appfy to themselves the brooder cultural stereotypes regarding the 
"mentally ill.” As a result, the social donoüor inqplied ly  the label was not posonalfy 
relevant, and those individuals escaped many of the label's negative consecpiences (Link et 
al., 1991; also Link, 1982,1987; Link et al., 1987).
To reiterate, the modified labeling theory suggests that those who avoid being 
labeled may experience fewer n%ative personal repercussions, while those who have been 
labeled successfiil^ may be initiated instead into a conqplex downward spiral in vdnch 
social devaluatioi lowers self-esteem, which in turn increases vulnoabdity to more, and 
more pronounced, negative labeling effects (Christensen & Rosenthal, 1982; D arl^ & 
Gross, 1983; Link, 1982,1987; Link et al., 1989; Link et al., 1991). Gender may also play 
a role (Darley & Fazio, 1980; Fumham & Schofield, 1987; Swann & Ely, 1984; 
Christensen & Rosenthal, 1982), with women more vulnerable to the shaping effects of 
others’ biases, and men more infiuartial in eliciting expectancy-reinforcing behaviors 
(Christensen & Rosenthal, 1982). In the social psychological literature, this reorganization
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of bdbaviof in line with eiqpectations has been termed behavioral confirmation. When 
those expectations are further absoaribed into the identity of the person so labeled, 
behavioral confiimatian becomes self-ZulfiUtiig prophecy (Darley & Faâo, 1980; Denton, 
1989; Link ti  al., 1989; MdLosg & Taub, 1987; Millon, 1975; Nusbaumer, 1983; Swann & 
Ely, 1984; Warner et al., 1989; Witztum et a l, 1992). And self-fiilfilling prc )̂hecy, to 
compile the cycle, "ultimately results in beliefs Wûcb are high in ... accuracy” (Swann, 
1984, p. 466; also Burk & Sher, 1990; Dickie, 1982; Hamilton et al., 1994; Hanis, 1994; 
Wyer & Lambert, 1994). A not uncommcm result is the reinforcement of stereotypes.
Non-Cognitive Con^xments 
of Labels & St^eotypes
Our steno^ped world ia not n tceasarify^  world-we tthould tike it to I». It is simply du kind 
v/y worldw$s3qmctittob*(Lppnumn, I922,p. 104). V
In the case ofmental illness stereotypes, as with all stereotypes, layers of personal, 
intapersonal, and cultural forces can combine with enough power to function effectively as 
a fijnn of social control (Coyne et al., 1978; Fiske, Bersoff, Borgida, Deaux, & Heilman,
1993; Weiner, Peny, & Magnusson, 1988). When belief systems become self-reioAxrcing 
in the manner just d^Ksribed, pe<^le may become ov^confident evw of beliefs which 
were initially &lse (Jussim, 19486; Neuberg, 1989; Swann, 1984; Waxman et al., 1991), 
ultimate^ reshaping realities in the \wdce of words (Buik & Sher, 1990; Dailey & Fazio, 
1980; Dentcm, 1989; Dickie, 1982; Hamilton et al., 1994; Hanis, 1994; Link et al., 1989; 
NfcLorg & Taub, 1987; Millon, 1975; Stnqpp, 1989; Swann & Efy, 1984; Warner et al.,
1989; Witztum et al., 1992; Wyer & Lambert, 1994). Despite this, research suggests that
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people are geoioalfy unaware of the in^jact of tlœir categorizationa on others (Burk & Sher, 
1990; D arl^ & Fazio, 1980; Fiske & Ruscher, 1993; Rosoihan, 1973; Swarm, 1984).
One reason for this disccmcertmg lack of awareness may be that the evaluation of 
others, such as is convened by a label, often occurs quite rapidly (Burk & Sher, 1990; 
D arl^ & Fazio, 1980; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Harris, 1994; Neuberg, 1989; Neuberg & 
Fiske, 1987; Sandifer et al., 1970; Strupp, 1989; Waxman et al., 1991). process of 
evaluation is a caitral human response (Epstein, 1994; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, &
Kaides, 1986; Fratto & Jdm, 1991; Wyer & Lambert, 1994; Zarate & Smith, 1990) whidh 
may be intricately linked to basic cognitive schemata. Schemata influence the perceptions 
of others by guiding the organizatian and classification of incomirrg data, and they often do 
so autcanatically. That is, schemata are cognitive mechanisms vdiich function without the
direct awar^ress of the subject (Bargh & Pratto, 1986; Fazio ei al., 1986; Fiske & 
Neuberg, 1990; Hamilton et al., 1994; Pratto & John, 1991).
When attention is differential^ directed toward undesirable stimuli, the process 
has been called automatic vigilance (Pratto & John, 1991). The effect appears to be at a 
rudimentary processing level; distmctkms are crudefy made in a binary style—yes/no, 
good/bad—with no other differences vhich might indicate a more refined analysis of 
valence. This very basic evaluation associated with perscmal, subjective attitudes then 
becomes accessible automatically on exposure to relevant stimuli (Fazio et al., 1986; 
Neuberg & Fiske, 1987; Pratto & John, 1991).
Stereotypes may be (me example of sudh stimuli (Lippmann, 1922; Pratto 6  Jcha, 
1991). Decades ago, lippmann (1922) criticized stereotypes toe inqx>sing "a certain
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chaiacter on the data of our senses before the data reach the intelligence” (p. 98). In 
inqxession formation, negative information is weighed more heavify in arriving at 
judgments of others (Ford & Stangor, 1992; Pratto & J<dm, 1991; Wyer & Lainbert, 1994);
in nonverbal CMumunication, paceivers tend to be more responsive to negatively-toned 
messages OPord & Stangor, 1992; Pratto & J(^m, 1991). Moreover, it appears that subjects
not only attend faeferentially to negative traits in oth^s, but they also remember
undesirable information more readily (Pratto & John, 1991; &ayder &> Cowles, 1979). 
GivNi that "attentional focus has been shown to inOuence social ju(%mait,” Pratto & John 
(1991) concluded that "automatic vigilance can thus lead to negative bias in judgment” (p. 
389).
Preinteraction EAects of Labels and Stereotypes 
on Person Perc^tion
N tiûurjtatieê, nar nurey, nor tmàt, »nur in to such ajuctgrnsnt, for àu judgment has pnemded dm 
mridsnos (l̂ pmann, 1922, p. 121).
The effects of such biases can be for-reaching. In fact, the most basic evaluations 
may also be the most ineenq>tive in trams of chaUra^ing potential misperceptions, since 
individuals must make initial ju^m ents about where, and with whom, to engage 
interpersonaUy (Dailey & Fazio, 1980; Fiske & Neubrag, 1990; Fiske & Ruscher, 1993; 
Swann, 1984). Such decisions obviousfy exclude many possible interactions. Based on 
non-cognitive, automatic evaluations, individuals may judge others unworthy even of their 
judgment. When stereotypes and labels influence the intrapersonal assessment of othras, 
independent of any specific action of those others, the net results are known as 
preinteraction effects.
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PremÈemcü<m effects axe a subset of the laig^ cat^oiy of «cpectaucy effects, 
wbidh has long been a subject of interest to psychologists. Over 400 studies have 
siqpported the «dstoKe of substantial expectancy effects and their impacts on subsequent 
interpersonal evaluations (Harris & Rosenthal, 1985). Early reseaidi on personality 
judgments indicated that once havinp fnrmed a belief- people tended to distort or overlocJc 
(ttsconfirming information even if they discovered that the belief had no evidentiaxy basis 
(Dailey & Fazio, 1980; Jussim, 1986; Swann, 1984; Temerlin, 1968; Wahl & Leflcowits,
1989). In what became known as the hah effect, sutgects also tended to ovwestimate the 
degree of coherence in the perscmalities of others (Asch, 1946; Darley & Fazio, 1980; 
Swann, 1984; Wyer & Lambert, 1994). Similarly, they huled to adjust their conclusions 
f(X the (xmstraining effects of situational influences. The latter tendency has been termed 
the Jimdamental attribution error parley & Fazio, 1980; Swann, 1984).
Eventually, Üie bulk of experimental evidence made one conclusion inescapable: 
the process of perstm pwception was replete with potential biases. That «mclusion 
created a minor crisis for the clinical field, vhich had defined itself (and continues to 
define itself) in t^ms of the objective and accurate evaluation of others. So problematic 
was the data emerging fiom «qiectancy leseaich that some researches considered it 
criticalfy damaging to the practice of pgychothwapy. In 1954, MeeU reported his 
axkbaixassmg conclusion that simple statistical models could combine information with 
greater accuracy than could highfy-trained clinicians (cf. Azar, 1995). Even worse, later 
research demonstrated that the judgments of one clinician based one source of data were
unrelated to the judgments of another clinician drawing fiom a different source, despite the
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&ct that both were assessing the same q îality in the «amA diait. When the amount of 
{xofessional tmining and eiqienmce WMe considered, those variables did little to inqxove 
the accuracy of judgments (Roseohan, 1975; Swann, 1984; Wills, 1978).
Fortunately, however, the profession of psychology suffered no permanent barm 
fr(»n these results. It rapid^ became clear that the sorts of errors ̂ ;\hich could occur 
leliabfy in the laboratory onfy rarely occurred in everyday (xmtexts. Early investigators 
realized that th ^  were guilty of the same %ror so well documented in their subjects, 
namely, the mistaken assun^on that the personalities of others are uniform and ccaistant, 
and independent of context-in this case, independent of the complex of variables vdiich 
defines actual clinical settings.
Nevertheless, additional studies have continued to highlight the extent to vhidi 
peiceivers such as clinicians exert a powerful influence on those perceived, their clknts, 
and vice versa (Day & Tappan, 1995; StruR), 1989; Swann, 1984). Yet despite much 
research evidence to the contrary, therapists and lay people alike often continue to assume 
that "the behavioral evidence th ^  have daived is valid and unbiased” (Darley & Gross, 
1983, p. 32). That assumptirm is incorrect. An expectancy is largefy an intrapsychic event 
which is on^ indirectly, and enigmatically, correlated with objective behavior.
In what has been temœd tlw cognitive confirmation effect̂  individuals can seek, 
and gain, confirmation of their erq)ectaticxis without reference to any action of the target 
peraoo(s) (Jussim, 1986). As just noted, automatic attentional processes are one avenue by 
which expectatirais nuy be self-reinforcing. In ccmtrast to automatic processes, which are 
defined by their inescrpability, controlled processes include crmsciousfy accessible
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expectancies and judgment heuristics (Baigh & Pratto, 1986; Fazio et aL, 1986; Neuberg & 
Fiske, 1987; Pratto & John, 1991). Controlled processes can contribute to the cognitive 
confirmation effect in a numb^ of ways. A hypothesis about a particular person w group, 
for instance, may seem subjectively more plausiWe to the perceiver simply on an 0  priori 
basis, given his or her past education, expoience, and acculturation (Bassock & Trope, 
1983-1984; D ari^ & Fazio, 1980; Dariey & Gross, 1983; Davies & Morris, 1989-90;
Ford & Stangor, 1992; Lippmann, 1922; Martin, 1987; Zarate St Smith, 1990).
Likewise, an e)q)ectaacy is apt to be more cognitiveh  ̂accessible—that is, more 
readify cued by relevant stimuli-vhen alternative hypotheses are numerous and not easily 
evaluated OBassock St Trope, 1983-1984; Darley St Fazio, 1980; Darley & Gross, 1983; 
Davies St Morris, 1989-90; Ford & Stangor, 1992; Lippmann, 1922; Martin, 1987; Zarate 
& Smith, 1990). A positivity bias plays a role here, in that it is cognitively easier to note 
the presence of certain features congruent with an e^qsectation than to considw the absrace 
of features vidch might point to an alternative (Bassock & "Dope, 1983-1984; Neuberg St 
Fiske, 1987).
Addhicmal judgments may be elicited simply by information about an individual's 
simerfidal characteristics such as physical appearance, race, social class, ethnicity, sex, 
style of speech, early perframance, perceived intelligence, or diagnosis (Christensen St 
Rosenthal, 1982; D arl^ St Fazio, 1980; Dariey & Gross, 1983; Denton, 1989; Fiske & 
Neuberg, 1990; Jussim, 1986; Hamilton, 1993; Wallston et al., 1976; Witztum et al., 1992; 
Ysseldydre St Algozzine, 1981; Zarate St Smith, 1990). Expectations are even affected by 
so simpk a variable as the ten q x ^  order of infimnation. Data presented first—for
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exan^>le, iofofmation provided in advance of an initial meeting-acta as an anchor to 
influence the inteipietations of later data (Asch, 1946; Darley & Fazio, 1980; Fiske & 
Neuberg, 1990; Harris, 1994; Jussim, 1986;Neulx»g, 1989; Ysseld^e & Algozzine, 1981; 
Waxman et al., 1991; Witztum et al., 1992).
AU of these cognitive &ct<MTS play a vital role in the process of person perception. 
Preconceived notions, based on personal or cultural socialization experiences, are naae 
readily accessible in memory and nrote easily elicited by superficial cues, and they are 
less apt to be chaUenged, especialfy in coo^lex interactions vhere the data axe amb^uous 
and the possible causal attributions are numerous. When additional information is 
presented in advance of a pesonal meetii%, those data can influence significant^ the 
inter%xetation of succeeding interactions.
The composite efiects of these factors has been demonstrated in one weU-known 
study (Darley & Gross, 1983), in vhich subjects viewed a videotape of a fourth-grade 
child ("Hannah”) and then were asked to evaluate her academic perfmraance. Half saw the 
diild against a suburban, middle-class backdrop; the other half saw the same child against 
an irmn’-city setting. After watching the child resp<md to achievonent-test problems 
designed to be lately  ambiguous and uninfbnnative of her abilities, those who thought 
Hannah was fimn a lower-SES badcground juried her to have a substantially lower 
academic abili^ than did those who believed her to have a more affluent upbringing. A 
higher-SES Hannah was also evaluated as significantly more motivated, sociable, and 
emotiooalfy mature.
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Notable in this stiKfy is that, although subjeots were asked to assess Hannah’s 
academic skUla, their évaluations of her were not confined to that area. Ihe stereotypes 
apparenttyengenekred by the class (SES) label earned in their wake a wide range of 
additional expectances, including evaluations of her likabUity and her potcdial for 
success, and interprétatifs of h e  personality characteristics. These results have raised 
important questions about the role of preinteraction e}q)ectancies in clinical sitings.
I Effects 
in the Clinical Doiuain
P a rtt is ^êartnaugh that under aenain conditions msn [sie ] rt^ on daa paweffiJfy tofiotiem eaài4^  
do to realities, and that in mar^ cases à i^  he^ to create the very fictions to which th ^  respond 
(Lippmann, 1922, p . 14; qf, also Wacman etaL, 1991).
The influence of (me expectancy iqxm others, throu^ their conq>lex ass(x:tations 
within stereotypes, may become even more pronounced as the evaluative task becomes less 
concise (Gauron & Dickinscm, 1969; Hamilton et al., 1994; Rosenhan, 1973,1975; 
Rothbart & Park, 1986). For clinicians who deal with those seeking mental health 
treatment, the interpersonal assessment is genoalty not confined to skill level or 
intellectual ability, but relates directty to a client’s intangible (pialities—bis or her 
emoti<ms, intrapsychic experiames, and personality traits. Not suqaisingly, these are the 
vray aspects vdiich are the most difficult %ther to confirm co* disconfiim. Personality 
attributes are abstract concepts which "can neither be serai nor found nor othrawise 
observed directty” (John et al., 1988, p. 172; also Allport & Odbert, 1936). They can only 
be inferred (Temerlin, 1968) and, in foct, are so inqrrecise that Allport called linguistic 
trait-names "ratbag categories’* onty roughty (imparable to one another (Altyxxrt, 1961, pp. 
355-356, cited in John et aL, 1988, p. 175).
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The possession or lack, of mental health is obviously even more abstract As 
labels, such descriptors as sane or insane, weU or ill, or heaUhy or unhealthy can activate 
numerous stereotypes; and inherent in these sterer^ypes axe certain faiity enduring 
expectancies. Two of the most fundamental axe that personality txaits axe "internal and 
causal tendenci^” (John et a t, 1988, p. 178). That was the definition given to them by 
AUport and Odbert in 1936 (John et al., 1988) and it is a view still widety held today 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994; Rosenhan, 1973; Wyer & Lambert, 1994). The 
results are pervasive beliefs; that persmahty traits are innate, or at least intrapsychicalty 
generated, and that observable behavior is their direct <x indirect eiqpression for which the 
individual is ultimatety xesptmsible (see Dickie, 1982; Retzingw, 1990; Tedeschi &
Willis, 1990; Wyer & Lambert, 1994).
Theodore Millon (1975) makes a similar point about diagnostic t%ms as officially- 
sanctioned labels, and in so doing, highlights a third fundamental expectancy. Millon 
claims that such labeling creates the in^pressiŒi of some "significant and valid attribute” 
which is "both salient and durable,” and ponoaan^t (p. 460). Not onty, tihen, are 
personality traits internal or innate, and generative ofbebaviw, but they are unlikety to 
change significantly. These e^iectancies are shared not onty by lay persons but by mental 
health professionals as welL hr a recent stwty, approximatety 80% of all inferences made 
by clinicians, irrespective of trainiirg or experience, rdied upcnr trait attributions f<̂  causal 
explanations of behavior (Waxman et al., 1991; see also Dickie, 1982; Wills, 1978).
The ioopact of these basic expectancies on those vho seek help are highlighted in 
yet another investigation. Two researchers (Ysseldyke & Algozzine, 1981) gave school
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pasomiel, mchiding psychologists, a case descripti<m of a child lefened for evaluatioiL 
The descriptioiis wese idaitical excqpt for the initial referral informatiom, which varied 
across sixteen oonditioDs. Of intœ st here are the two conditions viûch addressed the 
reason for referral. When the child was described as having beoa referred for "a behavior 
problem in school,” evaluating professionals were significantly more likefy to label the 
ctuld as emotional]^ disturbed than vthen the reascm for referral was stated to be "an 
academic problem in school” (p. 431). The authors note that this differœhal diagnosis 
was made regardless of the following test data, all of which was desigimd to indicate 
average performance: "decision makas placed ccmsidetable weight (m information 
pres^xted before assessment data were available, and foiled to reject stereotypes 
engaidered by that referral information” (p. 434).
Ih additUMi—as this research demrmstrates -the ̂ %ry selection of traits chosen fcx 
description anticipates categorization. For example, referral information about a "single 
blade female” has already singled out for attention, a priori, h ^  salient characteristics 
ODidde, 19482; Fiske &. Neuberg, 1990; Ferree & Smifii, 1979; Zarate & Smith, 1990). 
The choice of descriptors creates a contmct which will affect the direction and distribution 
of attartion, as well as the expectations, interpretations, and meanmgs of any later 
int^perscsial exchange.
Neubog (1989) attempted to danonstiate that cognitive biases could be attenuated 
by instructir% subjects to be as accurate as possible in forming impressions of the attributes 
of othars (cf. Neubag & Fiske, 1987). Althoi%h the studÿ involved the assessment of 
supposed job applicants, the format closefy parallels an initial clinical encounter.
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*k)terviewi»s” were given bogus perscmlit^ profiles of candidates prior to the initial 
meeting; in the negative-expectancy condition, (Applicants were described as conq>aiatively 
low in sociability, goal-directedness, and general ]MX>blem-solvtDg skills. No infonnation 
about these traits was provided in the no-e}q>ectancy condition.
Neuberg (1989) was surprised by his own results. He noted that the leseaidi 
paradigm was specificalty chosen to minimize the influence of pre judgments, not only by 
emphasizing the role of information-gathering, but also by providii% infoimati(Mi in the 
negative-expectanrty ccmdition that was potentialty readily discrmfirmable. Nevertheless, 
although the effects of cognitive biases ware reduced, they continued to influence the 
interactions significantty. Even those "intnviewers” motivated to be accurate evaluated 
the negative-expectancy subjects more pooity than subjects in the no-expectancy condition. 
Ratings by blind judges, on the other hand, suggested that these "applicants” actually 
ou^fform ed  the unlabeled groiQ> (see also Fiske & Ruscher, 1993).
The question necessarily arises at this point: when an individual is desaibed as 
"mentalty ill,” rather than merely as unsociable or pooriy motivated, how does that 
description influence the interpersonal assessment and perception of the person so 
labeled? In the preceding discussiw of preintoraction effects, we have seen the variety of 
\rays that judgment heuristics and cognitive biases are called into play in p^son 
perceptiorL Whm the interpersonal assessment is directed towards an individual’s 
psychological makeup-chatacteristics vhich are not only abstract and CMnplex but 
necessarily inferential-the role of expectancies assumes particular prominence.
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Stigma & Stereotyping:
Attitudes Toward the Mentalty HI
Nogod-m Uh»artttehatnan't *ntr»a^, ha-wkcoo turns to striks him down in his
wuAsednsss (Aescf^bis, Afomsmnon. IL 396-3!^).
A broad literature has investigated cultural expectations and stereotypes attendant 
upon the label "mentalty ill.” Historicalty in Western culture, mmtal illness has been 
(xmceptualized as divine punishment. That belief informed the classical Greek tragedies of 
the 5th century, B.C., gained new impetus with the dominance of the medieval Christian 
church, and sailed over on the Mayflower with our Puritan ancestors (Fabiega, 1990; 
Rotenbetg, 1978). The religious. Calvinist doctrine which has shaped both our American 
academic and social traditions has equated "mind, reason, soul, and spiritualty pure/good 
behavior wifli mental health and their contrastive cat^ories with psychiatric illnMs (e.g., 
lust, desire, sin)” (Fabrega, 1990, p. 298). Mental illness has been considered less a 
disorder than a territyii% testament of condemnation (Rotenbetg, 1978).
These historical themes -of moral failure, personal blame, and divine retribution— 
are instructive because they lingw. Albeit with new names, labeling, stereotyping, and 
stigma continue to haunt our modem reactions. For example, a recent surv^ (Socall & 
Holtgraves, 1992) of206 randomty selected residences in Indiana provided respcmdents 
with case vignettes describing the exact same behaviors. The only difiopence in conditions 
was the tag-line, vriiith attributed the behavior either to a medical or to a i»ychol<^cal 
condition. Subjects were significantty more rejecting (i.e, by h i^er ratings on measures of 
social distance) of those labelled maitalty ill than of the physically ill controls. Subjects
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also nted the m«3tal]y ill persoDis’ behavior as less predictable, and their ftitiire as less 
hopeful (cf. Link ^  al., 1989).
Throughout our society, in the present as in the past, attitudes toward the mentally 
ill have been generalfy negative (Burk & Sher, 1990; Denton, 1989; Fabrega, 1990; Farina, 
1981; Farina, AUm, & Saul, 1968; Fiske & Rusdier, 1993; Ftynn, 1987; Fracchia, Canale, 
Cambria, Ruest, & Sheppard, 1976; Goldin, 1990; Jones & Cochrane, 1981; Ldblinai & 
Vaisanen, 1978; Levinson, 1994; Link et al., 1989; Link et al., 1991; Mansouri & Dowell, 
1989; Mülon, 1975; Neubeig & Fiske, 1987; Preston & Smith, 1985; RaWdn, 1972; 
Retzinger, 1990; Rosenhan, 1973; "Stigma,” 1994; Thoits, 1985; Trachtenberg, 1986; Wahl 
& Lefkowits, 1989; Wallston et al., 1976; Wamw et al., 1989; Whitaker, 1990; Wills,
1978; Witztum et al, 1992). When a word or label is negativety evaluative, as in the case 
of mental illness, the label often carries a stigma. The stigma itself then encourues 
additional labeling, and the net result is a pool of problematic inferences vhich continues 
to widen.
Culp«d>ility, for example, has been considered a factOT in the assignment of stigma 
(Davies & Morris, 1989-90; Wallston et al., 1976; Weiner et al., 1988). People who carry 
a stigma are treated more as criminals, guilty of some wrong-doing or moral lapse, than as 
honest suff^ers allowed a socialty-sanctioned sick role (Davies & Morris, 1989-90;
Ftynn, 1987). Attribution studies indicate that, in general, people with mental or 
behavioral difficulties are judged as more responsible for their conthtion, and therefore as 
more guilty and blameworthy, than those with physical illnesses. Persons so judged are
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also deemed less worthy of help (Flynn, 1987; Preston & Smith, 1985; Weiner et al.,
1988).
Then again, stigma is equated with inferiority, a "degraded identity’* (Fabrega,
1990, p. 290; also Davis & Moms, 1989-90; Ooldin, 1990; Farina et aL, 1968; Lcngmore,
1985; Mansouri & Dowell, 1989; Preston & Smith, 1985; WeinCT et al., 1988; Whitaker,
1990). Stigmatized individuals are considered social^ unacceptable or, in some way,
spoiled; they are perceived as "difkrent” and "in some cases as not having the right to a ...
normal life” (Davis & Morris, 1989-90, p. 110; also Denton, 1989; Ftyrm, 1987;
Longmwe, 1985;Momnaw, 1995a; Retzinger, 1990; "Stigma,” 1994; Witztum et al., 1992).
Once status is lost to a stigmatizing label, the social demotion can be almost irreversible
(Fracchia et al., 1976; McLoig & Taub, 1987; Millon, 1975; Preston & Smith, 1985;
Rosenhan, 1973,1975; Rothbart & Park, 1986; Simmons, 1992; "Stigma,” 1994).
In an attenq>t to quai^ify attitudes toward the m^taUy ill. Link et al. (1989)
conducted a ccanmunity surv^ of 169 reqxmdents who had never been in treatment
themselves and who scored on psydhological tests as having no evidence of pathology.
Subjects were given a questionnaire r%arding their perceptions of the degree of
stigmatization of former mental patients. The authors summarized the results as follows:
75 percent of the community sampla agreed that en^loyers wül discririimate 
against former mental patients; 80 percent and 66 percent subscribe to similar 
expectations with regard to dating relationships and close friendships respective^
71 percent agreed that former patients will be seen as less trustworthy, 62 percent 
that they will be seen as less intelligent, and 70 percent that their opinions will be 
taken less seriously (p. 411).
Such views are not confined to the United States. In a recent cross*cultural study 
which included England, Bengal, and Thailand, the researches found that of the nine most
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
35
sti^natized iUnesses, four woe mental illnesses: alcoholism, drug addiction, 
sdiizc^^ireDia, and d^nession. Indeed, all but depression out-mnked even AIDS on a 
linear analogue scale measuring n a tiv e  attitudes (Davies & Moms, 1989-90). In 
Canada as well, a stigma reduction program has been recently instituted in the public high 
schools in an attempt to challenge widefy-held negative stereotypes of mental illness 
(Mound & Butterill, 1993).
In all societies, however, and certainly in our own, the so-called "mentalty ill” 
ccmqxrise onty a small proportitm of the peculation. According to the modified labeling 
theory, an individual onty receives a cultuialty-suicoited label of mental illness after 
displaying some overtty problematic œ idiosyni^tic behavior to serve as a stimulus. For 
the vast majority of pe<ck v&o sedc psychological tfeatnumt, sudi clearly deviant 
behavior is not the norm. By far laigw numbers seWc assistance, often <mty briefty, for 
ordinary problems of living. The persons in this grotc are able to ftmction with minimal 
impairment and raiety if evwiequiie hospitalization. They number in the millions 
(Goleman, 1993), yet th ^  often obtain services fimn the same sorts of professionals, such 
as psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers, as the mxxe severety "mentalty ill.” 
How, then, does society distinguish the two groics in terms of labeling effects, stigma, and 
stereotyping? Or does it?
To date, the research addressing these questions has been extremely limited. Some 
of the data are anecdotal; fm  exanq>fe, a recent news analysis of the potential presidential 
candidacy of Genaal Cohn Powell in 1996 noted that his detractors were hkety to attempt 
to discredit him by revealing that his wife had received mental health treatment. Into this
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cat^Qiy also fiüls the political &te of Senator Thomas Eagleton, \Niio was f<xrced to 
withdraw as a vice-presidential candidate when his treatmaat for depression became 
public.
Sinularfy, an attorney in Virginia sued the State Bar Assodation after she was 
dm ed a license for leftising to answ^ a question about past psychological treatment. The 
National Conference of Bar Bxaminers justified the question as an attempt to screen 
potential lawyers fta- mortal health. Infrxmatimi about past treatmait, they maintained, 
would he%p than better judge "who tW persrm is now, and v\ho t l ^ ’ie going to be 
predictive^ in the future** (dted in Momnaw, 1995a, p. 04). Ihe influence of biased 
erqpectandes is especially clear in the last qpjotaticaL Mental health treatment was viewed 
as indicative of an impairment of the person, such that it could render an applicant unfit for 
tW exercise of her or his professirmal responsibilities. In this case, the attorney’s struggle, 
as she pursued her suit all the way to the federal courts (and won), scans to indicate 
clearfy that mental health treatment does indeed carry a stigma (Caplan, 1992; Harris,
1994; Lehtinen & Vaisanen, 1978; "Sterna,** 1994; Tedeschi & Willis, 1993; Whitaka,
1990), even when the type of treatment is unspecified, and even when it is several years in 
the past
Beyond what can be gleaned from sixdi anecdotal data, however, the informational 
cupboard is relatively bare. There is little research relevant to the cultural eiq>ectancies 
attendant upon those vho seek mental health treatment but vho never join the ranks of the 
dutKoicalty mentalty ill. Most of the data are inferential and must be extrapolated from the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
37
bodies of liteiatuie on resistances to treatment, risks of treatment, and barriers to help- 
seddng behavior. From that literature, however, a few cautious conclusions can be drawn.
Many authors agree that potential clWtts oAm seek therapy as a last resort, in part 
because they consid^ undeigoing treatment to be an admission of personal feihire (Harris, 
1994), to be an embarrassment or source of shame (Moomaw, 1995bi Thoits, 1985; 
Whitaker, 1990), w to be a sign of weakness (Harris, 1994; Moomaw, 1995b; Whitakar, 
1990). In fact, as most practitioners are aware, the stigma surrounding mental health 
treatmait is such that people may delay treatment or avoid it entirefy (Harris, 1994; Link et 
aL, 1987; Whitaker, 1990), or atten^t to minimize the impact of negative stereotypes by, 
for exanq>le, paying privatefy for sessions rath^ than using employee health insurance 
benefits (Harris, 1994).
n »  presence or d^ree of stigma may vaiy s<xne\^iat with socioeconomic class.
A few researchers have noted the presence of a subgroup of affluent consumers fcsr i^hom 
"going to therapy is trendy” QHairis, 1994, p. 153). Link et aL (1989) refer to this subset as 
the "fiiends and supporters of psyChothwapy  ̂(p. 420), for vdiom having an analyst may be 
a status symbol. Yet in one study, even those lAho felt generally positive toward treatment, 
and who had often soi^ht previous psychotherapeutic help, nevertheless rated labeling and 
stigma as s%nificant risk factors attached to the seeking of treatment for one’s child, either 
for the child him/herself or for the paraît (Jensen, McNamara, &Gustafeon, 1991). More 
generally, the act of seeking treatment is seen as an admission that a person cannot solve 
his her own problems (Harris, 1994). Especially within working class norms, turning
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to a profeasiooal for help may be considered a sign of inadequacy, or of rejection by ûumily 
and friends otherwise would have provided the needed support.
Ihe presence of stigma inq>lies a negative cultural judgment or e3q>ectation, but 
leaves the contents of that judgment or expectation unspecified. Many investigators 
hypothesize that the stereotypes associated with treatment are a derivative of the broader, 
negative societal attitudes toward mental illness in general (Link, 1982,1987; Link et al., 
1987; Link et al., 1991; Mound & Butterill, 1993; Tedeschi & Willis, 1993; Whitaker,
1990). The mechanism of application is then postulated as follows: When aoy label, such 
as that of **m^tal illness,*’ is well-known or pervasive in a given culture, all members of 
that culture are necessatiJ^ affected. Potential cliarts and clinicians are no excqrtion and 
both, therefore, are immersed in the existing sociocultural attitudes about mental UMess. 
According to this view, if an individual should eventual^ ent^ treatment and receive a 
diagnc^is, thow beliefs suddenly become personally «applicable and painfiilly salient (Link 
et al., 1989; Link et aL, 1991).
Similarly, should an individual eventually choose a career in the helping 
professicms, he or she is also affected by a lifetime of acculturatioa. T h(^ same negative 
judgments inescapabb^ and insidiousfy affect martal health professionals, to the extent that 
the therapeutic process itself can contribute to a negative labeling cycle. For exanq>le, one 
reviewer offered a summary of labeling effects upon "irondisturbed" or "neurotic" persons 
(Wills, 1978, p. 969), that is, upon those not usually considered menta% ill. He «mcluded 
that the balance of tW literature indicates that "several processes . cooduce toward
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
39
im&vorable pefcq>üan8 of clieat8...[wliidk] operate indq>exMk3it of a client’s adjustment 
problems or pathology” (Wills, 1978, p. 994).
Lü essence, then, mental health professionals and their clients share a set of 
culturalty'Suppofted, stereotyped expectances of &e therapeutic process 'which are 
pessimistic and evaluative. Not surprising]^, patients’ attitudes toward themselves are 
also often n%ative, reflective of that societal evaluation (Jones & Cochrane, 1981; 
Lehtinen & Vaisanen, 1978; Warner et al., 1989). Professiwals as well appear to be 
consistently more n^ative in their evaluations of clients than are lay judges, with no clear 
data that the professionals are, in fact, more accurate (Wills, 1978).
In addition, therapists and clients engage one another within a relaticHial world 
sh^)ed by the medical model. Most people who seek help do so out of emotional distress, 
whether as aprimaiy {resenting problem or as secondary to scsne other issue such as 
interp%5(mal or work difficulties (Thoits, 1985). Within a disease paradigm, etiological 
explanations are intrapwsonal; thMefCe, the nature of tWapy within that context implies 
that "...it is the individual who is the problem" (Caplan, 1992, p. 8). That is, h e  medical 
model reinfbrces the notirar that «notional distress is due to persrmal flaws or feilings 
(Bentley et al., 1993; Didrie, 1982; Harris, 1994; Moranaw, 1995b; Retzinger, 1990; 
Schore, 1990; Thoits, 1985). People who seek treatment "...are likely to (xmclude that th ^  
are inadequate, distressed, disturbed, having nervous breakdowns, unable to cc^ , going 
crazy...," or, perhaps, that they have a "chemical imbalance" in the "brain" (Thoits, 1985, 
p. 242).
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The tenu patient tm y also cootribute its own set of expectancies, which include 
traits such as "powerlesmess, passivity, and illness” (Harris, 1994, p. 156). In her work 
with women diagnosed with borderline personality disorder, one clinician iqxxted that the 
label seaned to reinforce the women’s perceptions of themselves as being "flawed,” and 
"mentalfy ill,” with a "probable inability to change” (Hamilton, 1993, p. 154). The women 
purportedly also offered the diagnosis as an explanation for behavior, suggesting that they 
were influenced by the cognitive biases vhidi attend upon stereotypic judgments such that 
attributions for behavior are made in light of the original label.
Several researchers have provided data which sean to indicate that individuals 
who consult maotal health professi<nials are more read% or mwe stror^b^ rejected, as 
evidenced by higher scores on social distance measures, than are those who seek help flcan 
religious pasonnel or primary care physicians (Rabkin, 1972). Amcmg athletes, those who 
cmisult sprats psychologists are more stigmatized (i.e., on a multidimensional scaling 
analysis questionnaire) than those who seek the advice of coaches for the same 
performance problems (Van Raalte, Brewer, Linder, & DeLange, 1990). In fact, the stigma 
attached to psychological "diseases” may extend evm beyond the individual sedking 
treatment, through a paocess of taint-by-association, sometimes re lie d  to as a ‘̂ courtesy 
stigma” (Gofihnan, 1963; cited in Burk & Sher, 1990, p. 158).
One study investigated both professional and peer assessments of diildren of 
alcoholic Amilies (COAs). Teenagas rated unknown peers, who were described as 
having alcoholic parents, as healthier than "mentally iU” teens, but sigmficantly less healthy 
itniti "typical” tears. Likewise—and ccmtrary to the eaqiectations of the researchers—mental
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health professt<»ials rated "COA” adolescents as mœe inq)aired regardless of infoimatioai 
concerning their current behavior. As a group, they were considered unhappier and more 
socially isolated, and were deemed more likely to face future problems with substance 
abuse, incarceration, affective disorders, intimacy problems, and mental health problems 
requiring psychotherapy (Burk & Sher, 1990).
In all of these cases, contact with the mental health system carried with it the 
suggestion of inferiority, the whiff of disrepute. For those who seek their own treatment, 
whether in the past or in tt» present, the data suggest that a negative label can be rather 
easily and quickly acquired, with many of the same repercussions, though perhaps milder, 
that often attach to the more seriously "mentally ill.” Those repercussicms can include 
negative societal evaluation, reinterpretation of behavior and réévaluation of the person, 
and difficulties in obtaining such things as insurance, employment, professional licensure, 
or public office. Many of the same negative events befall even those who do not seek 
treatment themselves, but who have a family member who is the recipient of psychological 
services.
So, perhaps a person becomes a "patient” as soon as he ox she enters the door of a 
mental health clinic, but of what sort? What are the elements of the supposed "illness” 
which our culture attributes to those who seek treatment? And how far do the contents of 
mental illness stereotypes extend before some other categorization seems more applicable? 
Clearly, to better understand the labeling cycle as it influences our judgments of others, we 
need more data on the specifics of the expectancies involved. We know that stereotypes
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exist; we must now explore the oooqxaoeut parts of those stemofypes. For that information, 
we turn to the assessment literature.
METHODOLOGICAL REVIEW 
Measurement of Stereotypes
For approximately the last 60 years, researchers have engaged in trying to measure 
stereotypes. Although modem statistical analyses have gotten more complex, the basic 
methodologies are few in number and relative^ single. They are essentially four the 
adjective checklist, p^eentage measures, semantic differential techniques, and the 
diagnostic ratio.
Katz & Braly (1933) pioneered the assessment of stereotypes with a checklist 
measure of racial categoric. In a remarkably sophisticated anafysis given its era, theirs 
was an assessment of group, or social, stereotypes "not based iqxm animosity toward a 
member of a {xosciibed group because of any genuine qualities that inhere in him [sic]” (p. 
280). Their measure consisted of a list of 84 adjectives fiom viiich subjects were to 
select those deemed "typical” of a given racial group. Upon conviction of this task, they 
woe then asked to go back and mark the five words (xmsidwed "most typical” of the target 
groiv (p 282). By tallying the percent^e of respondents v/bo endorsed a given trait for a 
specified group> a numerical picture emerged %tich represented the degree of cultural 
coosaisus f<x each stereotype.
The original checklist procedure also ccanbined, almost incidentalty, a quantitative 
approach with a qualitative twist: subjects were allowed to contribute their own adjectives 
to the designated list if they so chose. This liberty was apparentty little used by Katz & 
Braly*s (1933) (xiginal subject pool of 100 students, since the total number of added
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descriptors was only 14 (Kigbam, 1971). However, later researchers have expanded 
iqxm this design by using a ntm-optional, fiee-response fonnat intended to probe the 
cognitive accessibility and therefore, theoreticalty, the associative strength of various 
group attributes in memoiy (Ford & Stangor, 1992; see also Wbissell & Chazuk, 1985).
Variants of the cheddist procedure have d(xninated the stereotype-assessment field 
for nearly forty years, and continue in use today (Brigham, 1971; MoCaul^ & Stitt, 1978; 
Martin, 1987). In 1972, however, a second assessment device was proposed. The 
semantic ditforential technique consisted of a s%ies of bipolar trait scales wfaidi could 
provide a sŒnevhat more refined quantitative anatysis of ingroup ccmsensus (Gardn^, 
Kirby, Owospe, & ViUamin, 1972). Extremity of evaluaticm (that is, valence) could be 
derived by conq>arison to a neutral mid-point (Ford & Stangor, 1992; Gardner et al., 1972; 
McCaul^ & Stitt, 1978).
Checklist and sanantic differential measures can onty assess paoeived between- 
group differences. Therefore, the questicm remained unanswered as to the degree of 
witbin-g^orq) variability vhidi could be tolerated within an otherwise agreed-tqpon 
stereotype (Brigham, 1971; McCauley & Stitt, 1978). How much latitude did individual 
members of a stereotyped groiq> possess? This aspect of stereotype research was largely 
ovedodced until the late 1960’s, with the emergence of a percent%e measure first 
pn^x>sed by Brigham (1971) in his doctoral dissatation.
The percentage method consisted basically of asking sul^ects to estimate, or to 
circle, the percentage of groiq> members whom they believed possessed a givm 
stereotypical trait, that is, the probability of having trait X, given group membership Y:
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/Ktfaü/Qioup membership) (Brigham, 1971; McCaul^ & Stitt, 1978). în a variant of this 
procédure, subjects were asked to give a percentile range vdûch they considered 
reasonable (Brigham, 1971).
Interesting^, even a high d%ree of consensus r%aiding a given group trait may 
neverthdess be conqMmtivefy flexible when applied to individual members, even in the 
abstract For example, vdien a pocentage assesammtt was added to Katz & Braly’s (1933) 
original cheddist procedure, subjects vho largefy agreed on certain adjectives as typical 
of a particular ethnic group, nev^theless estimated the within-groiq) percentages for some 
of those traits at less than fifty percent. The condusion was clear: between-group 
stereotypes are "6r frmn exc^tionless g îeializaticMis” (McCauley & Stitt, 1978, p. 933).
Yet a furthw refinanent to stereotype measuremmt emaged not long after 
Brigham’s (1971) wmk. The diagnostic ratio was an attenq>t to combine anah^es of 
within-grotjp variability with population base rates ^cCauley &. Stitt, 1978; Martin, 
1987). In this approach, subjects were asked to estimate not onty the probability of a 
specified trait, givm gro)q> membership [p(trait/Group membership], vhich is a percentage 
assessment, but also the probability of the trait [p(trait)] in general (McCauley & Stitt, 
1978). When the estimated trait-given-ethnicity was divided by the estimated base rate for 
that same trait, the result was a ratio vhich distinguished betweai stereotypic and 
nonstereotypic characteristics. A mean ratio significantty different fiom 1.0 was 
considered diagnostic of stereotypy.
The diagnostic ratio helped to refine the definitirm of a cultural eogiectancy fiom 
mere (piantity—wherein the stereotyped group was semi as possessing more of a given trait.
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moro often—to a criterion based on distinctiveness. The mtio measme can enconqxiss 
situations in Wüch a descriptor may characterize only a small percentage of a given group 
in absolute tmns, but still be perceived as relative^ more probable for that g ro#  than fw 
people in genmal (Ford & Stangor, 1992; McCauley & Stitt, 1978; Martin, 1987).
Each of the above methodologies has as its enquxical focus those characteristics 
perceived to be shared by large (often stigmatized) social groups. However, stereotypes 
have been anafyzed in numerous different aspects, including uniformity (degree of 
int^subject crmsensus); directirm (tevcaable or un&vorable); valence (extremity of 
direction); content; typicality, and distinctiveness (Brigham, 1971; Ford & Stangor, 1992; 
Gardner et al., 1972; Katz & Brafy, 1933; Martin, 1987; McCauley & Stitt, 1978; 
Zawadrid, 1948). Accordii%ly, eadi stereotype measure yields data somevhat different 
ÊomtheothMS. It ranains,tfa^ to attonpt to understand better the nuances of each 
approach.
Katz & Biafy’s (1933) cheddist measure is perhaps the most elegant in its 
sinq>lidty. As mentiooed, it is an analysis of social stereotypes, that is, its purpose is to 
quantify ingroup consensus regarding w ious outgroups; it assesses content, typicalify, and 
uniformity. However, a percent%e procedure can assess witfain-group variability of the 
st^eotyped prqnilation, wh^e the checklist method cannot (Brigham, 1971; McCauley & 
Stitt, 1978; Zawadrid, 1948).
The checklist measure is also limited in that it defines stereotypes in sheer 
frequency terms. Those adjectives most often selected by subjects are presumed to 
constitute the consensual norm. It is quite possible, then, for a relative minority to
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detenniiie group "consensus” if these is considerable variability of opinion withm the 
subject pool. The sanantic difietential attempts to lectii^ this proWem by using a t statistic 
to evaluate consensus. The data fitan a//subjects aie pooled, so that equal weight is given 
to responses u&ich disagree as well as to those in agreement (Oardnear et al., 1972).
Both the semantic differential and the di^nostic ratio attanpt to quantify valence of 
asteteofype. Since they are measures ofdepaiture from a neutral point, both can provide 
evidence of extremify of belief in eith^ direction. The diagnostic ratio alone, however, 
has the added advant%e of being able to ofi^ evidorce of "n^tivefy distinctive 
stereotypes” (^cCauley & Stitt, 1978, p. 935) in vdiich a group is characterized by its lack 
of a particular trait.
Clearfy, the various assessment devices differ in their underfying theoretical 
definitions of stereotypes, as well as in their methodological approaches. In feet, however, 
the data overlap to a significant degree. A comparison between the semantic differential 
measure and the Katz & Brafy (1933) cheddist indicated crmsiderable, but uneven, 
overlap; ccnrelations ranged fiom .44 to .87 dep^ding on the ethnic group assessed 
(Gardner et al., 1972). The sanantic differential appears to be methodologicalfy 
coaq>arable to percentages measures (Eagfy & Steffen, 1988).
Ccxnpariscns of the Katz & Brafy (1933) procedure with Brigham’s (1971) 
percentage measure yielded correlaticms of .79 and .67, for two different subject groups.
The checklist measure cranpared to the diagnostic ratio gave correlations of .49 and .66 
(McCauley & Stitt, 1978). (Values cited have been changed to a positive sigou 
Correlations in the original stucfy were all negative due to the xank-cadeting procedure
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used, in which m<ne typical traits were ranked lower than less typical ones). In both 
anatyses, the percmtage measure conelated bighar with a checklist approach; the 
diagnostic ratio apparentty offers slightly different infoimaticm. Ihe Katz & Braly (1933) 
paradigm may in fiict cut across both later types of procedures, fusing likelihood of a given 
descriptor ̂ leroentage measure) with distinctiveness of that desaiptor (ratio measure) into 
a single, global estimate (McCauley & Stitt, 1978).
A major limitation emerges fw all of these estimates, however. The end result of 
any (piantitative ana^is of stereotyping is a numerical définition of category membership. 
One must then wonder, however, if a stereotype differs fiom a mere assessment of 
objectivety  ̂observable qualities. Indeed, McCaul^ & Stitt (1978) offer as a strength of 
the diagnostic ratio that it can demonstrate stereotypir% to be one exanmle of the larger 
process of "human concqytoal behavior” (p. 938).
But is file evaluative expectation of people, based on a potentially superficial 
social cue such as group membership, truty the same as distinguishing a chair from the 
larger group of fbur-legged objects, as those authom suggest? We return to the earlier 
definition of stereotypes, in whidh they are postulated to be the cognitive conmonent of an 
affectivety-Iaden process (prejudice) with potential bdbavioral expression 
(discrioiination) ^iske, 1993; Sigall & Page, 1971).
Measurement of Prejudice 
An anatysis of the stereotypes regarding recipiafis of tnenfal health treatment would 
provide infcamation about the cognitive contents of those stereotypes. Such research 
would offer greater detail about the beliefs and expectancies which prevail in our society.
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and therefoie some furttter illumination about the labeling cycle and its e£fects upon human 
intaactions. La order to draw conclusions with any practical meaning, however, the tiifold 
aspect of stereotyping must be ccmsidered. Since beliefs, attitudes and behavior are far 
from perfectly correlated (Farina, 1981; Jones & Cochrane, 1981; Link et al., 1989; Finer 
& Kahle, 1984; Karlins et al., 1969; Rnbkin, 1972; Trachteid>ag, 1986), we could glean 
(xmsiderable infrrmation about expectancies, only to discover that th ^  infhrnxe behavior 
not at all, or that they influence bdbavior in sœne unexpected, or contradictory, fashion. A 
direct bdravioral assessment was deaned too unwiel(fy fw the cunMit research.
However, the second component of stereotyping, prejudice, is relativeb^ accessible to a 
paper-and-pencil fxmat and offers a valuable, sec<md source of infotmaticm frran vdiich to 
move toward a fuller understanding of the stereotypes in question.
There are no tried-and-true methodologies for tlœ assessment of prejudice, as there 
are for detemairiing the cognitive aspects of stereotypes. Many have been used 
sporadically; few have been subject to r%orous checks of reliability and validity through 
replication studies. Ncme were found which were specific to assessmaits of therapy 
recipients or even of the broader category of the "mmtalty ill.” Nevratl^less, a couple of 
principles have emerged from a review of the literature.
The first such principle is that, in general, an erq^ectancy must interact with some 
genuioA task in order to be relevant to the subject (Snyder & Uianowitz, 1978). Therefore, 
vdien not using direct behavior assessments, prejudice instruments generalty must inquire 
about behavior in genuine situations with some significance or import to the daily lives of 
the subjects. This may be especialty true of enquiry about negatively stereotyped groups.
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"In uninvolving situations of little ctmsequence, peopk will treat stigmatized otbos with 
relative und^standiag; howevn, in situations of high involvement or adaptive significance, 
stigmatiang behaviors can be expected” (Finer & Kahle, 1984, p. 806; cf. also Fabrega, 
1990; Farina, 1981 ; Flynn, 1987; Fracchia et al., 1976; Neuberg, 1989; Trachtenberg, 
1986). For exanq>le, in one study, researchers queried subjects as to vdiether they 
believed a motho' would entrust the care of her child to an ex-mental patioit [sic]. In that 
study, subjects (xefeired someone convicted of a crime and jailed over a pason with a 
past psychiatric hoq>italizaticn (Farina, 1981).
A second princq>le addresses the potential connection between label, stigma, and 
prejudice. Hae, previous research has su^ested that questions related to social 
distariciiig are iiecessary in order to elaborate the emotional responses connected to a 
(cognitive) stereotype. LWz (1981) summarizes this perspective with the question,
"Would you want cxoe for a fidend” (p. 353)7 Another research team found that the best 
predictcxa of sügtna were the assumed degree to vdiich a perceived illness would diange 
the personality and interp^sonal relationships of the sufierer (Davies & Mrmis, 1989-90).
In the attMopt to assess prejudice, then, experim^tal instruments will have to be 
devised viuch nevertheless build on the results of previous research. Specifically, aixy 
prejudice instrument should address behavioral choices in situations of practical relevance 
to subjects, and should include evaluations of social distancing. Unfortunately, even these 
two areas of enquhy are insufficient alone, since they are likely to be defeated fay the savvy 
of subjects, especially within a college-educated population. At this point mitas a last
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wrinkle in the atteng)t to tnify understand and assess stereotyping: social desirability 
concerns.
Social Desirability
Hopefully, it is clear fay now that people in general do respond negativety to those 
labeled mentally ill. Ihcreasingty, howev^, such responses during research data 
collection are usually (xmGned to times when subjects are unaware of their behavior or are 
not monitoring it q)ecificalty. When, on the other hand, attention is drawn to the 
significance of their actions, subjects generalty respcmd hurty and hivorabty (Farina,
1981). In other words, social desirability coiKems may mask ejqnessions of stigma cm 
paper-and-pencil tests vdien subjects are insulated from the potaitial discomfort of 
personal interaction (Fertee & Smith, 1979) and when they are acutety aware that their 
responses are being monit(»ed or evaluated (Farina, 1981; Fracdiia et al., 1976; Hamiltrai 
et al., 1994; Link et al., 1989; Sigall & Page, 1971; Trachtenberg, 1986).
The influence of such concerns is pervasive even in the earty literature, vhere as 
for back as foe 1940's, a proportion of subjects hesitated or resisted categorizing ethnic 
groups based sirqpty on label alone (Brtyihani, 1971). By the 1950's and *60's, subjects 
were beginning to find foe task offensive or insulting; and in one stucty, "neaity 20% of the 
subjects refused to cooperate entirety" with portions of a stoeotyping assessment (Karlins 
et aL, 1S>69, p. 15).
Nor, apparentty, will all subjects use cultural stereotypes to infor other personal or 
group characteristics. Given instructions to "form a cong)lete inqxressiraf of a (fictitious) 
woman, subjects fold onty her sexual orientation were generalty unwilling to draw
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CQQclusiofis in the absaice of other badcgroiind information (Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978, p. 
943; see also Jones & Cochrane, 1981). Likewise in social psychological experiments, 
subjects shy away from the indiscmninate u% of some stereotype (Darky & Gross,
1983).
An historical trend is in evidaace. Not implausibly, psydbology and othe social 
sciences may take part of the credit. The American populace, and certainfy the college 
students Wro often form the bulk of subject pools, have been increasingly e;qx>sed to 
research r^arding social psychological phenomena. The greater accessibility of higher 
education has, of course, encouraged this trmd. Some authors also presse that the media 
have gradually curtailed w discouraged portrayals of traditional stereotypes in both 
entertainment and the news QCarlins et al., 1969), although the reverse may be true 
i^arding pcxtrayals of the mentally ill (Flynn, 1987; Mansouti St Dowell, 1989; Wahl St 
Leflcowits, 1989).
It would appear that people are becoming increasingly aware that stereotypic 
responses, as noted above, are a form of category-based, rather than fully individuated, 
ipprmsal (parley & Gross, 1983; Fiske, 1993; Jussim, 1986), and that (xmsciously 
engaging in sudi categ(Hizatic«is is becoming less acceptable. All research, therefore, must
address, ever more carefully, subjects* motiws to offer socially desirable responses. One 
resolution to the conundrum lies in the distinction between social and personal stereotypes. 
Social stereotypes are those that are consensually defined within a culture or subculture. 
Personal stereotypes^ on the other hand, are t^ s e  held by * single individual rather than
by the larger social groiq>, that is, they reflect "vho has how much of what stereotypes*
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(McCauley & Stitt, 1978, p. 935). Personal stereotypes, then, reflect the d^ree to uduob a 
givm individual either embraces, or deviates from, consensuallv dmved social 
expectancies (Karlins et al., 1969).
By focusing on social stereotypes alone, subjects are not chall«kged as to their 
pasonal beliefs. Instead, they are allowed to maintain a cognitive distance from, and even 
a distaste for, their own responses; simultaneously, th ^  are also motivated (hopefully) to 
respond to situational demand characteristics by attemptii% to demonsUate competence in 
the e3g)enmental task. Accordingty, sutgects can be instructed to "danonstrate the extent of 
their knowledge of genaal stereotypes but not to demonstrate the extent of their 
endorsement of these stereotyped ccmceptions** (Snyder & Uianowitz, 1978, p. 944). 
Rathm^thanattaiqpt to stage a sophisticated (and usualty eq>ensive) decqption in order to 
access hidden opinions, this approach to social desirability concedes the potential for 
discrepancy and allows subjects a free-saving exit i^iile preserving the int^rity of the 
stwty.
CONCLUSION
The e x t^  to which research studies on stereotyping must address social 
desiiabUity concerns is another interestimg testament to the power of labeling. Subjects are 
motivated to hide or deny their awareness, and certainly their siqyport, of many types of 
stereotypes. Once again, we see that to label is to judge and, especially vhen the label is 
psycholc^cal and the stereotype concerns mental illness, those judgments are
pmedominantty n^ative. Nonetheless, despite a growing cultural awarmess that labeling
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may be undesirable, the data indicate that categoiy-besed evaluations remain a part of the 
process of person perception.
In short, labeling and stereotyping continue; and with them come a variety of 
e^qiectations that may influence the interpersonal assessment of others irrespective of any
acticms of those others. Such effects are called preinteraction expectancy effects. Along 
with other e3q>ectanciM, premteraction expectancies inpose a rudimentary, cognitive order 
(m our intetp^onal world whidr offers at least the illusion of stability and predictability. 
Therefore, violation of an expectancy is often an emotionalty disconcerting exp%ience. 
Rather than witness the "the murder of a Beautiful Theory by a Gang of Brutal Facts’* 
(Liipmann, 1922, p. 14), information may be attmded to selectively, recalled selectivety, 
or pursued selectivety. Disccmfiiming information may also be discounted, reinterpreted, 
or attributed to situational factors (Darley & Fazio, 1980; Darley & Gross, 1983; Jussim, 
1986; Katz & Braty, 1933;Lippmann, 1922; Neubag, 1989;Zawaddd, 1948), Those 
processes can be pow^ful enough at times to reshape, and even to redelQne, reality. The 
wiginal expectancy is preserved.
The modified labelmg theory posits just such a powerful social cycle for those v/bo 
receive a negative label like "mentally ill." Accordh% to this view, a host of negative 
tep^cussions ensue fiom the label itself. These repercussions serve to conpound the 
difficulties for which the label was initialty applied. Throi%h stigmatizing social attitudes 
and discrirrunaticm in sudi vital areas as housii%, employment, and insurability, an 
individual may becmne so trapped in a n ^ tiv ety  labeled role that escape becomes 
extremely difficult.
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As to how the processes involved in inlapersoDsl evaluation affect the TniHifma of 
people who sedk brief counseling or therapy, the data are sparse; however, the preliminary 
woric just reviewed would indicate that the same tnechfrniatng which serve to devalue the 
serious^ iU may also diminish the ordinarily troubled. Cultural stereotypes become 
pmionally i^licable at the moment of seeking treatment; the vehicle for treatment, the 
medical model, defines hel^seekmg as indicative of illness or abnormality (Goldin, 1990; 
Harris, 1994; Moranaw, 1995b); and the clinical setting itself papetuates and reinforces a 
series of negative expectancies. The intaactions proposed ty  the modified labeling theray 
are set fiilfy in motion, from label to stereotype to bdhavioral confirmation to self-fulfilling 
prophecy to the reinforcement of the original label once again (cf. C*g>lan, 1992; Link et al, 
1989; Link et al., 1991; Temedin, 1968). Langer & Abelson (1974) desoribe the process 
succinc
In practical terms, the labeling bias may have unfortunate consequences.... Once an 
individual enters a therapist's office for craisultation, he [src] has labeled himself 
'patient.' From the very start of the session, the (mentation of the conversation may 
be cpnte negative.... The theraj^st's negative expectations in turn may affect the 
patiwt's view of his own difficulties, thereby possibly locking the interaction into 
a self-fulfilling gl(x>my prc^ecy....If the therapist were not given the label patient, 
he would see a very different range of behaviors or attribute the given behavirxs to 
factors other than the patient's 'illness' (p. 9).
Still awaiting investigati(m, however, are the social expectancies concaning the 
nature of that psychological "illness" fiom whi<h the mental health "patient” suffers. 
Clinicians make dir^noses, but vhat is the diagnosis, theju%ment, of s(x>ie  ̂at large? 
What are the conponarts of the stereotype(s) vhich descmbe, not the mentally ill, but the 
man or woman who seeks outpatient psychotherapy? The current research begins to 
explore those questicms. The first stucfy will investigate whether, indeed, the negative
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stereotypes vdùcb are associated with the mentally HI are likewise q^licable to those ̂ o  
seek "ofdinaiy** psychological treatment, and if so, to'«diat degree. The second stu<fy will 
address the role of medical terminology as a potmtial stimulus in eliciting stereotyped 
expectations.
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CHAPTER TWO:
METHODS
S tu^ 1 
P artic i^ ts
One hundred two (102) male and female students in undergraduate courses at the 
University of Montana participated in this study for various incentivea. Those in 
introductoiy psychology participated in the study in partial fiilfilhnent of a course 
lequiiemait. Students fiom other courses were awarded extra course credit.
The initial stwfy in this pair was designed to document the presence of current 
stereotypes, if any. Hoarding those vdio use mental health services, and to define the 
em teit of those stereotypes. Subjects were laxKhnnfy assigned to one of four conditions. 
The first condition acted as the control groiqp; all questions in this group related to 
fictitious peqple vdro have an appointment with a fiimify phg^ician. The remaining three 
(xmditioms varied according to implied degree oflabdn%. Therefore, Condition 2 asked 
about people vriio "have a first ryppointment with a psychologist” (minimal label). 
Condition 3 queried percepticms of people who "have been seeing a psychologist for a 
year” (intermediate label). Condition 4 asked about individuals "who are mortally ill” 
(strong label).
A broad approach seemed necessary to capture the inhaent conq>lexity of 
constructs such as stereotypes and expectancies. Previous research on stereotypes has 
indicated that different instruments yield different data (see Methodological Review). 
Consequent^, a multi-method approach was used; participants in each condition were
56
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asked to fill out a seri^ of tiuee quantitative instruments assessing consensual ^poup) 
stereotypes. A last, more open-ended device was included to tiq> prejudice, the affective 
dimension of stereotyping.
Prior to administering any of the instruments, smne mitial work was done via pre­
testing. Specifically, an independent group of 50 subjects was administered a variant of 
the Katz & Biafy (1933) cheddist measure (see Section A, below). From this testing were 
drawn the ten traits most ofien ranked as "typical” of a perscm described as "mentalfy ill. ” 
The ten traits ranked as "least typical” were dso isolated. An additicMoal five traits, of 
interest because subjects seemed divided as to their "typicality,” were also included.
Those 25 traits then formed the content of the diagnostic ratio measure which is described 
in Section C, below.
Cî̂ heckhsklSÆeftsijyEfe
Instrument 1 is based on Katz & Braly’s (1933) checklist procedure. As noted 
{ueviousty, that procedure is an ana^is of social stereotypes, that is, its purpose is to 
quantify ingroup consensus r%arding various ou%ronps. Since it was first (fevised to 
measure racial stereotypes, however, it might seem at first glance to be irrelevant to 
questions of mental health/illness. In order to remedy that situation, additional traits were 
derived fiom informal discussions conducted among 54 introductory psychology students 
as they studied chapters on psychopathology and the psychotherapies. Those discussions 
entailed asking students to generate the traits they most associate with the label "mentally 
ill ” The descriptors with the greatest degree of consensus were added to the Katz & Brafy
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(1933) list, for a total of 100 adjectives. The entire checklist is n^snoduced in Appendix 
A.
R: Semantic Diflferential
The second instrument, a semaidic differential, consists of a series of bipolar trait 
scales, and offers a more fine-grained analysis of ingroi^ consensus (Gardner et al., 1972). 
Extmnity of evaluation (that is, valrace) can be derived by conqparison to a neutral mid­
point (Ford & Stangor, 1992; Gardner et al., 1972; NfcCauley & Stitt, 1978). The list of 
bipolar traits was synthesized from two earlier studies (Jones & Cochrane, 1981; Wallston 
et aL, 1976). Jones & Cochrane used a list of 31 adjective pairs, 10 of which were 
considered illness-specific based on previous research; the remaining 21 were ccmsidaed 
"neutral” and were drawn from research on ethnic stereotypes. Other descriptors were 
drawn from research on person perc^tion (Wallston et al., 1976). The coooplete list is 
reproduced in i^ipendix B.
Cl IJx&gjüfxttjLC Rfltio
The third instrumrait to be administered was a diagnostic ratio measure. This 
procedure allows perceived group traits to be corxq>ared with population base rates 
(McCauley 6  Stitt, 1978; Martin, 1987). Subjects were presented with the Ust of twenty- 
five traits gererated through pre-testing (see above) and asked to estimate the percentage of 
group membaa that they believed actually possess that particular trait. They were also 
asked to estimate the frequency of the trait (also in percentages) in the general population 
(McCauley & Stitt, 1978). When the estimated trait-given-category is divided by the 
estimated base rate for that same trait, the result is a ratio which distinguishes between
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stereotypic and nonstaneotypic charactoistics. The coo^lete diagnostic ratio mstnunent 
can be found in Appendix C.
D: Ecgjiidiog Meamire
A final measura was designed to assess subjects’ affective responses to groiq> 
membership. The device consists of a list of questions in a 7-point Likert-type format, 
vdddb allows comparison with a neutral midpoint and therefore evaluation of valence of 
respœse. The questions Wnch conqxise the instrument were (Wved fiom previous 
research (Davies & Morris, 1989-90; Farina, 1981; Faree & Smith, 1979; Fracchia et al. 
1976; Lietz, 1981; Finer & Kahle, 1984; Snyder & Uianowitz, 1978) and center largely 
around anafyses of social distancing responses in hypothetical interactions which have 
been shown to be both realistic and relevant to subjects in general. However, the 
prejudice measure as a wiiole has been designed ty  the author and thaefore must be 
cœsidered an e?q)%imeotal instrument of unknown reliability and validity. Of interest in 
ihid study wiU be its overlap, if any, with the previous^-described measures of (cognitive) 
stereotypes. The prejudice measure is reproduced in Appendix D.
Preseatation
Fot each measure, the adjectives or trait-Usts were printed in random order. The 
semantic differential had the negative and positive mds reversed in 50% of trials in order 
to ccmtrol for systanatic response biases (Jones & Cochrane, 1981). To avoid serial 
positirm or (xmqiarison effects, the order of presentation of instruments was 
counterbalanced in four sequaices: ABCD, BCDA, CDAB, DABC.
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Although care was taken to select traits which are reasonably common in everyday 
language, some students may have been unfamiliar with some of the tenns in the checklist 
measure. To assist such students, and to ensure that any qpienes wwe addressed in a 
standardized manner, short, dictionary definitions of all words were appended to the 
instrument package. Subjects, in turn, were admonished not to guess at meanings, since this 
could add an unacceptable degree of subjectivity to the final data.
Instructions for subjects were synthesized firom tlmse published in earlier studies 
(Coyne et al., 1978; Katz & BraJy, 1933; Ford & Stangor, 1992; Snyder & Uianowitz,
1978). In general, instructions were designed to elicit awareness of cultural stereotypes, 
rather than personal use of, or subsmption to, particular labels. The foUowing paragraphs 
were printed on the front of the questionnaiie packet; the ejqperimenter also read it aloud to 
subjects priw to administratirm of the instruments:
This study is concerned with the assessment of cultural stereo^pes. Our 
intMest is in determining the (haracteiistics that society genem/(y attributes to 
certain categories of p^ons. You will be given limited information about people 
fiom different groups and asked to marie the descripdrais vhichyou think many or 
most peqple in our society would agree with. You are to ignore both the accuracy 
of these stereotypes as well as your perscmal accq>tance of these stereotypes. Your 
cmly task is to demonstrate your knowledge of general stereotypes; an awareness of 
social stereotypes is mÈ (xmsidered an endorsement of them.
For exanq>le, a recent movie was entitled "White Men Can’t Jump.” 
Stereotypes relating race to athletic ability may be true, paitialty true, or untrue;
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and they may be offensive to some people. Pediaps you feel they are ingiilting  
NEVERTHELESS, most of us in this culture are fa m ilia r  with those stereotypes. 
We know about them. So, if you were questioned about "white men” and "the 
ability to jump” in the following q^estioonaiies, you would demonstrate your 
knowledge of the stereotype, mgardless of your personal feelings, in order to 
complete the stu<ty correctty.
The information you will be given is eartremety minimal. We are aware that 
this makes the task mrwe difficult, but it is important for the purposes of the 
research. Simply do the best that you can. Ifyou find the task b^ond your ability, 
please notify the resean^&er. You are not required to participate in this or any other 
s tu ^  if you do not wish to do so.
NOTE: In filling out the foUowing form, please DO NOT GUESS at the 
meanings of words. A list of brief definitions is provided in your packet. If you 
are unfamiliar with a particular word, look it up before continuing. IT IS 
IMPERATIVE that you understand the words you are ranking. If you loc^ up a 
word and stiU don’t understand it, skip that question and continue.
Thank you for youT participation in this research.
Additional instructions were printed at the tc^ of each instrument, relevant to that 
particular measure. AU instruments and instructions, exactly as th ^  were presented to 
subjects, are rqxroduced in the Appendices. Upon cconpletion of the questionnaires, 
subjects were instructed to return the questionnaires to their origmal manila envelope and 
to seal the envelope. Subjects were then presented with a last writtoi instructian which
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constituted the mampoktioii chedc. The instnictioQ read as follows; "Please write on the 
back of your folder, as best you can remonber, the EXACT one-line description of the 
people you were evaluating.” Once subjects respœided to the manipulation check, they 
were free to turn in their folders and leave the room.
Since this leseardi posed little risk to subjects and no deception was involved, no 
formal debriefing was carried out at the time of data collection. However, subjects were 
informed of a time and place at \diich the results of the study were made available to them 
and any lingering questions or concans could be addressed.
Sti«fy2
Participants
One hundred twenty male and female students in undergraduate courses at the 
University of Montana participated in the sturfy in partial fulfillment of a course 
requirement ex for extra course credit
Procedure
The second study in this pair was designed to assess the degree to vhich medical 
model terminology can serve as a cue in eliciting the stereotypes defined by Study 1. The 
des%n was a 2x3 factorial, in which participants first were randomty assigned to one of 
two cmditions, defined as the medical ("patient”) or non-medical ("client”) subject 
category. Participants were further randomty assigned to one of three levels vhich vary 
from Tninimal suggestion of illness to sick-role label. Level 1 uses the phraseology, 
"referred to a psychologist” (minimal sr%gestion/ no illness terminology). Level 2 states 
that the individual "has been referred to a psychologist but has not been diagnosed” 
(moderate suggestion of illness/ambiguous medical terminology). Level 3 indicates that
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the iodivichid in questioa has beeaiefeired and has been diagjaosed, although no 
infocmation is given as to type of diagnosis (sick loleAnedical tenninology).
In total, then, there were six conditions relating to degree of suggestion of illness: 
client referred to a psychologist [CR]̂  patimt referred to a psychologist [FR]; client 
referred to a psychologist but not diagnœed [CRND], patient referred to a psydiologist but 
not diagnosed [FRND]; client referred to a psychologist and di^nosed [CRD], patient 
refeired to a psychologist and diagnosed [PRD]. The same instruments, instructions, and 
procedures used in Stucty 1 were followed for Stucty 2, including the use of items selected 
through initial pre-testing, except that all items related to the six specific conditions of the 
second stucty. AU instrurnents and instructions are rqnoduced in their eiitirety in the 
appendices. Debriefing was scheduled in a &shion similar to the first study. A time and 
place was posted for those subjects wishing to discuss the research, its purpose, or the use 
to i&hidi the data wiU be put; and any remaining questions were addressed.
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CHAPTER THREE;
RESULTS
Description of the Sntgect Population
Since data collection for both Study 1 and Study 2 was conducted simultaneously 
firom the same subject pools, the chamctaistics of the subject populati<m have been 
ccMubined. Of222 total subjects, 157 were drawn firom undergraduate courses in 
introductory psydiology or abnormal psychology. An additional 65 subjects were drawn 
fixxn undergraduate courses in Afirican-Amaican studies.
Most subjects identified with a European-Amoican cultural heritage (87.4%). The 
majority were female (60.S>%), between the ages of 18 and 25 (89.6%), and from middle- 
class (50.9%) and rural (72.9%) badkgrounds, A complete breakdown of all demographic 
variables, by stu<ty as well as ferthemtire sangle, is presented in Table 1.
Sccaing
Since both studies relied upon the same four measurement instruments, scoring of 
those instruments will be discussed together. As a first step in condensing the data, 
summary scores were drived for each instrument within each condition. For the adjective 
checklist, three summary scores were assigned in the following manner. Each of the 100 
traits was first assigned to a valence category, either positive, n^ative, or ambiguous. 
Within each valarce category, each trait was then given a 1 (checked) or a 0 (not checker^. 
The fiequencies within each categcay (positive, n%ative, ambiguous) were then summed to 
give three summary scores for each subject: Checklist Positive (possible range = 0-30); 
Checklist N^ative (possible range = 0-60); and Checklist Ambiguous (possible range = 
0- 10).
64
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TABLE 1: DEMOGRAPHIC DATA
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Study . lQfelQ2^ Study3(N=120)
data = ficquency/perccfit
TotalCN=222)
VARIABLE
i. AGE
asder 18 
18-23 
26-40 
41-35 
0vcr S3
1 / 1.0 
90/88.2 
10/ 9.8
1 / 1.0 
0 / 0.0
0 / 0.0 
109/90.8
8 / 6.7 
3 / 2.5 
0 / 0.0
1 /  .5
199/89.6 
18/ 8.1 
4 / 1.8 
0 /  0.0
2. GENDER
female
male
63 /  63.7 
37/36.3
69/37.3
51/42.3
134/60.4
88/39.6
3. FAMILY INCOME
<$10^00Qfÿr.
$10-25,000
$26-50,000
$51-75,000
$76-100,000
>$100,000
2 / 2.0
17/16.7
29/28.4
23/22.5
14/13.7
17/16.7
5 /4 .2  
16/13.3 
28 /  23.3 
33/27.5 
19/15.8 
19/15.8
7 / 3.2 
33/14.9 
57/25.7 
56 /  25.2 
33/14.9 
36/16.2
A CULTURAL HERITAGE
Eanqtean-AiiMekaa 89/87.3
AfikaD-AnMficB 2 / 2.0
Native American 0 / 0.0
Asiaa-AmcricaD 4 /  3.9
î lîapaiiK» ..or-
Larin-Americao 3 / 2.9
KftiedoroOier 4 /3 .9
105/87.3 
3 / 2.5 
0 /  0.0 
1 / .8
1 /  .8 
10/ 8.3
194 /  87.4 
5 / 2.3 
0 /  0.0 
5 / 2.3
4 /  1.8 
14/ 63
5. RELIGION
None 42/41.2
Cadwlic 23 / 22.5
Protestmt 20/19.6
Xemrii 1 / 1.0
Tmditiomal
Native American 1 /  1.0
54 /  45.0 
27 /  22.5 
16/13.3 
0 / 0.0
1 /  .8
96/43.2 
50/22.5 
36/16.2 
1 / .5
2 / .9
ptdyOtenric
@pmlua%
Kfocmon/LDS
Christian,
nonspecific
1 /  1.0 
14/13.7
0 /  0.0 
22/18.3
6. HOME TOWN POPULATION 0-100.000=iunl; over 100,000=wtMu)
1 / .5 
36/16.2
0-10,0000 24 / 23.5 26/21.7 50/22.5
10^000-50,0000 30/29.4 28 /  23.3 58 / 26.1
50^000-100^000 24 /  23.5 30/25.0 54 / 243
100,000-500,000 12/11.8 14 /11.7 26/11.7
over 500,000 12/11.8 22/18.3 34 /1 5 3
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ADPmONAL DEMOGRAPHIC DATA
7. Hmve you ever been to ■ mental hemWi profeuloDai or sougbt counsettng for yomrwlf? A om tal btaHfa 
proftsstonal w uM  fodnd« •  p^ditatrtst, pqrcboiogist, social w orbr, coonsolor, and/or other p^chotiicrapist
Yes 37/36.3 53 /  44^ 90/40.5
No « 4 /£2.7 65 /  54.2 129/58.1
(No Respoose^fissiag Date) 1 / 1.0 2 / 1.7 3 / 1.4
8. If  so, how many DIFFERENT times hava you started traatmamt?
+ IS tunes 1 /  1.0 0 /  0.0 1 / .5
10-15 times 2 / 2.0 1 / .8 3 / 1.4
5-10 tunes 3 / 2S 2 / 1.7 5 / 2.3
2- 5 tunes 15 /14.7 26/21.7 41 /18.5
o n^ ltu u e 18/17.6 24/20.0 42/18.9
9 For how long (that is, how many sessions) each ttano, on average?
> ly ear 6 /5 .9 2 / 1.7 8 / 3.6
Stiî btiy < 1 year 3 / 2.9 2 / 1.7 5 / 2.3
6m outin- lyear 8 /7 .8 10/ 8.3 18/ 8.1
>10tunes;<6moutiis 1 / 1.0 5 /4 .2 6 / 2.7
5 1 0 times 3/  2.9 12/10.0 15/ 6.8
2-5times 9 / 8.8 15/12.5 24/10.8
Itune 7 /6 .9 7 / 5.8 14/ 6.3
10. Have yon ever had a fiunily member who has been to a mental hcaith professional or soogbt psychological
counseling?
Yes 61/63.7 63 /  52.5 124 /  55.9
No 40/39J2 55/45.8 95 /  42.8
(No Response/h&sing Data) 1 / 1.0 2 / 1.7 3 / 1.4
11. Do you know anyone else who has ever been in therapy?
Yes 86 /  84.3 95 /  79.2 181/81.5
No 15/14.7 23 /19.2 38/17,1
(NoResponse/hÆssiugData) 1 / 1.0 2 / 1.7 3 / 1.4
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The second measure, the semantic differential, was composed of 40 items in a 7- 
point Likert-type scale Counterbalanced items were recoded in order to reverse the 
scoring such that 1 was consistent^ the negative pole and 7 consistmtly the positive pole. 
A Differential Total summary score for each subject was calculated by adding the point- 
values for each item. Possible scores ranged firom 40 to 280. The 19 items of the 
pr^udice measure, which also used a 7-point scale, were recoded and scored using the 
same procedure. Possible Prejudice Total scores ranged from 19 to 133.
For the diagnostic ratio, subjects had to ofier two types of pwcmtage estimates: (1) 
the estimated probability of each of 25 traits within the designated gro%q) [p(tFait/Group 
memb^^iip] and (2) a base rate fr)r each of those same traits [p(trait)] in the general 
population. To score this instrument, a ratio score was first calculated for eadh item by 
dividing the estimated tntit-givm-group by the estimated base rate fw that same trait. This 
calculation produced 25 ratio scores for each subject Percentages oiiginalty listed by 
subjects as Os in the diagnostic ratio were recockd as Is to give a divisible number. A 
single summary score for each subject was then calculated by summing the individual ratio 
scores on each itmi (possible range = .25-2500).
For all instruments, missii% data within each condition were replaced by group 
mean semes. In those instances wdiere more than one or two items on a givm instrument 
were missing, the entire instrument was dropped fitMu all analyses. Since instrummts were 
also presented in four counterbalanced sequences, an ANOVA for order effects was 
ccmducted. A single anomalous result emerged in Study 2; here, the Checklist Negative 
score was significant^  dififereol in one of the four order presentations, F=3.96, p=.01.
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However, this finding was not (xmsistent with Study 1, in vdiich all pairwise conq>ariBQDS 
using Tuk^'s-HSD were nonsignificant. Since the single finding in Study 2 does not 
lefiect any pattern in the overall results, order of presentation was dismissed in 
subsequent anafyses as having any effect.
Group-Level Analyses
StudyJ.
For each instrument, the dependent variables of Stu(fy 1 were subjected to a one- 
wsy analysis of variance (ANOVA) by strength of label. Analyses yielded a main effect 
on all instruments. Multiple pairwise conq)ariscxns using Tuk^-HSD tests indicated a 
significant difference for the control group (^ u p  1) on four of six summary scores: 
Cheddist Negative, E(3,98>=20.48, p=.0000; Checklist Positive, E(3,98)=l 1.61, p=.0000; 
Efifferenfial Total, E(3,96)=8.47, p=.0000; and Prejudice Total, E(3,95)= 16.73, p=.0000. 
The Cheddist Amlriguous summary score, vdiidi reflects neutral or ambivalent adjectives 
in the Cheddist measure, was nonsignificant: E(3,98)=l. 14, p=.34. Scores on the 
diagnostic ratio showed a slightly difièrent pattern. Here it was condition 4, the so-called 
strcmg label condition ("mentally ill”), that differed significant^ fiom the other three 
conditions: E(3,96)=2.76, p=.05. Mean respcmses are listed in Table 2.
Studi)L2
A 2x3 analysis of variance was used to anafyze the four measures in Study 2. No 
significant results were obtained for any summary sc(»e. Mean responses are listed in 
Table 3. F-iatios and probabilities for the primary dependent measures are shown in 
Table 4.
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TABLE 2: MEAN SUMMARY SCORES BY CONDITION
Study 1
69
MEASURES
ADJECTIVE
CHECKLiST
Nqplhw
Podtive
COMKUL 
(N -2 7 )
8.11 (9.31) 
8.44(6.90)
CONDITIONS
laLAEEl. HEAR
(N -2 5 ) (N -2 5 )
AaMgDOUS 2.19 (1.75)
24.20(10.44)
3.00(4.21)
1.52(1.05)
25.00(10.42)
2.16(3.04)
1.68(1.25)
MENTALLY ILL 
(N -2 5 )
28.44(11.04) 
2.28 (2.35) 
1.80(1.26)
20.48
11.61
1.14
.0000
.0000
.34
SEMANTIC
DIFEERENHAL I6I .07 (35.82) 124.71 (28.93) 129.79(16.69) 116.84 (24.69) 12.88 .0000
MACMOSTK
RATIO
PREJUDICE
28.26(13.33) 36.78 (18.54) 35.94(12.20) 42.58 (25.37)
84.42(21.82) 59.08(13.18) 61.61 (12.84) 59.04(14.57)
2.76
14.90
.05
.0000
NOTES: «id» «re Haled « m e n m iM M ^  «ewe (atnjiildevMtioB). F<irSeiiMnlir DMfar«nliil«DdP»i^Ddiceine«saw«,iw»gracowg-ffe«ter 
iKgdh%.
CONranONS: Ccnbvd-qqpA wilh {diyskâân. W eppl-pe»«m W & ateppt Whpayclwdfigial 1 YR- pcnon h «  beep xremg psycbologrrt 
fiweyev. MenlalyS=peison s  moiidly 3 .
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TABLE 3: MEAN SUMMARY SCORES BY CONDITION
Study 2
MEASURES
ADJECTIVE
CHECKLIST
Negative
Positive
Ambiguous
SEMANTIC
DIFFERENTIAL
DIAGNOSTIC
RATIO
PREJUDICE
rXent** CONDITION 
BfiCd Rerd/Not diagaoaed 
CN = 20) (N = 21)
25.25 (15.10) 
2.15 (4.90) 
1.90(1.92)
29.14 (11.58) 
1.48 (2.73) 
2.10(1.37)
128.95 (26.21) 118.90 (24.98)
41.95 (17.36) 61.32 (64.23)*
56.95 (14.74) 55.48 (15.07)
ELsKt™di£Diflgiii£2fifid 
(N = 20)
26.20(14.56)
2.10(2.40)
1.80(1.64)
114.81 (16.95)
48.03 (23.23) 
48.90(8.94)
MEASURES
ADJECTIVE
CHECKLIST
N a tiv e
Positive
Ambiguous
SEMANTIC
DIFFERENTIAL
DIAGNOSTIC
RATIO
PREJUDICE
•ToÊtoa” CONDITION
R sE d R ePd/N fit diagnosed
(N = 20) (N=19)
27.22 (12.68) 23.68(12.79)
1.06(1.11) 1.37(1.86)
1.67(1.61) 1.32(1.20)
116.90 (25.03) 123.00 (31.17)
44.05(29.30) 
52.65 (13.14)
34.46 (20.40) 
53.06 (14.92)
Refd/Diagno$#d 
(N = 20)
23.90 (11.83)
1.95 (5.03) 
1.40 (1.54)
122.11 (26.01)
52.02 (35.70)
55.95 (16.13)
hlOlES: daU an  listed as m en  sonniiaiy score (stn d sd  dewtion). Fm Scmntic Diflbreniial and Fiqudice 
measures, lower scores “  greater oegaiivify.
* stendafd dewadnm exceeds mean score m das comdidoo doe to a smg^ exteeme ondier. Date recalculated uAhout die 
oadksr give die fiAreringvdnes: 48.02(20.75).
CONDTITDNS; Rpd^mftfied to a {K^diolo^Bt; refdteot diagnosei^re&ned to a piycb(dogiat Imt not diapwsed;
feTd/diag^KMeé-xeiiand to a psydicdogist and diagjoosed.
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TABLE 4 : 2x3 ANOVA 
F-RATIOS and PROBABlLmES FOR SUMMARY SCORES
Study 2
MEASURES E(d6) jt
CHECKLIST 
NEGATIVE
[subject cat^oiy] .63 (1,112) .43
[degree of suggestion of illness] . 13 (2,112) .88
[interaction] .78(2,112) .46
CHECKLIST
POSITIVE
[subject cat^oiy] .52 (1,112) .47
[degree of suggestion of illness] .33 (2,112) .71
[interaction] .26(2,112) .77
CHECKLIST
AMBIGUOUS
[sut^ect categoiy] 2.67(1,112) .11
[degree of suggestion of illness] . 14 (2,112) .87
[interaction] .31(2,112) .73
DIFFERENTIAL
TOTAL
[subjectcat%oiy] .00 (1, 111) .96
[degree of suggestion of illness] .30 (2, 111) .74
[interac^on] 1.63 (2, 111) .20
RATIO
TOTAL
[subject cati^ofy] 1.08(1,112) .30
[degree of suggestion of illness] .39 (2,112) .68
[interaction] 2.24(2,112) .11
PREJUDICE
TOTAL
[subject category] .00(1,112) .97
[degree of suggestion of illness] .31 (2,112) .73
[interaction] 1.85(2.112) .16
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
72
Content (Item-Level) Analyses 
The content of all four research measures (adjective checklist, semantic 
differential, diagnostic ratio, and prgudice measure) was sutgected to a descriptive 
analysis W ddh, 'wiküe not statistically robust, can help illuminate the specific content of the 
stereotypes being assessed. Other descriptive information was gleaned fiom qualitative 
data in the fiee-resp(mse section of the Adjective Checklist, and fiom lespcmses to the 
manipulation dieck.
Table 5 summarizes the results fiom the adjective checklist measure. The traits 
most fie(piently selected by subjects as descrq>tive of persons seddng mental health 
treatment (indicated in the table by italics) include such descriptors as "unstable,** 
"withdrawn,** "insecure,** "crazy,** "paranoid,** and "odd.** Those traits least oftm marked 
by subjects cm the adjective checklist are also shown in Table 5. The latter traits may be 
indicative of a negative stereofype, that is, of a stereotype defined by the lack of certain 
chaiactmstics. To try to avoid adjectives that sinq>ty were not chedced in any condition, 
onty those adjectives vhidh were infiequentty marked in comparison to the control group 
were considered potential candidates for the negative stereotype of psychotherapy 
recipients. That list (indicated in the table ly  bold print) includes items such as "fitithful,** 
"efiSdent,** "ambitious,** "loyal,** "kind,** and "conventional.**
Table 6 fists the most «dreme scares fimn the semantic differential measure. Onty 
two adjective pairs were rated neutral w above (positive valence), and tiiey wane the same
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TABLE 5: ADJECTIVE CHECKLIST
% SUBJECTS ENDORSED
NEGATIVE
VALENCE
(Ns6Q)
TEAIT Shidy-I Control
stupid 40% 42% 4%
quarrelsome 36% 41% 4%
unstable 95% 97% 30%
treacherous 29% 39% 7%
pleasuf^Ioving 9% 9% 30%
vepgefiil 35% 36% 7%
irre^ n sib le 56% 64% 22%
showy 9% 15% 7%
withdrawn 84% 84% 22%
unfi4endly 41% 52% 15%
ignorant 40% 40% 19%
evasive 55% 48% 19%
over-eater 36% 35% 11%
insecure 88% 92% 26%
loner 76% 75% 19%
cowardly 39% 36% 15%
dangerous 61% 67% 19%
suspicious 72% 75% 30%
irrational 76% 76% 15%
miserly 21% 22% 11%
aggressive 35% 43% 11%
neurotic 76% 78% 30%
plysically dirty 32% 32% 15%
cra^ 83% 78% 15%
foî getfiil 37% 43% 4%
boastful 3% 7% 7%
conceited 7% 12% 4%
sly 17% 26% 11%
scary 69% 67% 19%
unreliable 69% 65% 11%
superstitious 29% 29% 15%
likes to start 23% 40% 7%
loud 28% 23% 7%
paranoid 84% 83% 30%
agitated 63% 58% 19%
imitative 20% 15% 0%
la ^ 29% 23% 11%
impulsive 48% 37% 19%
perverted 57% 66% 11%
arrogant 8% 14% 7%
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FQSmVE
VATiENCT?
(N=2Û)
socially inappropriate 73% 78% 15%
faoatical 37% 53% 11%
% SUBJECTS ENDORSED
studsa Control
angumentative 43% 32% 7%
materialistic 11% 8% 11%
naive 40% 23% 15%
imsucces^l 60% 56% 11%
odd 85% 81% 26%
dishonest 28% 39% 7%
poorly dressed 37% 29% 7%
boriqg 25% 18% 7%
selfish 20% 19% 7%
quick-tempered 60% 51% 11%
rude 31% 36% 7%
stubboni 32% 27% 4%
deceitful 37% 47% 7%
suggestible 25% 19% 7%
cruel 28% 33% 7%
humorless 32% 34% 7%
radical 35% 31% 11%
sensitive 32% 20% 41%
intelligent 11% 8% 56%
faithfiil 5% 2% 41%
ontgoing 8% 1% 30%
effidm t 4% 0% 41%
happy 8% 1% 33%
practical 8% 3% 56%
good sport 3% 1% 26%
imaginative 20% 13% 19%
analytical 19% 15% 30%
progressive 4% 3% 22%
meditative 15% 13% 15%
ambitions 1% 5% 33%
shrewd 20% 22% 4%
alert 8% 7% 48%
traditional 3% 3% 41%
carefree 16% 8% 11%
passionate 9% 3% 22%
loyal 5% 4% 22%
stndghtforward 9% 3% 22%
elegant 0% 2% 7%
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AMBIGUOUS 
MAU 
(N=10)
so|riUstlcated 3% 2% 19%
hard worker 5% 3% 37%
kind 4% 3% 37%
generous 3% 3% 15%
96 SUBJECTS EhmORSED
TRAIT Stiutyl Stu*L2
artistic 19% 12% 4%
witty 9% 10% 19%
famJIy-ori^ited 9% 3% 67%
courteous 3% 2% 37%
neat 4% 7% 19%
persistent 13% 8% 15%
sexual 28% 35% 26%
talkative 28% 13% 22%
individualistic 19% 23% 11%
stoic 15% 21% 11%
very rdigious 8% 7% 26%
nationalistic 3% 5% 7%
couvoitional 0% 3% 37%
me&odical 16% 18% 22%
quiet 45% 40% 22%
conservative 5% 6% 33%
Notes: ItaKcized “  endorsed by 55% or more of sul^ects in bodi studies. Bold- endorsed by less dun 
10% of subjects in both studies, cunpared to control group scores.
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TABLE 6: SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL 
A. MOST NEGATIVE SCORES with Control Group Coaxq>ansoQ
NOTES: l>nnostiiegfÉfve;4«veiiÉnit 7«viost positive
lE ittP airs Study_l
Mean Score
StUfbLZ Control
(N=75) (N=120) (N=27)
Insane/Sane 2.32 2.27 4.78
Withdrawn/Outgoing 2.39 2.54 3.96
Umisuai/Usual 2.49 2.29 4.30
Conhising/Understaiidable 2.49 2.37 4.22
B. MOST POSITIVE SCORES with Control Group Conqiarison
Trait Pairs Study 1
Mean Score 
Study 2 ContEol
(N=75) (N=120) (N=27)
Proud/Humble 4.72 4.68 3.78
Insensitive/SeDsitive 4.37 4.38 4.81
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two pairs in both Study 1 and Studÿ 2: proud/humble and inseositive/sensitive. By 
contrast, 23 of the 40 adjective pairs in the control group averaged 4 (neutral) or above.
Nearly aU scores from the diagnostic ratio measure were statistically «ignifîAanf as 
measured by one-sample l-tests. (A BrModfenoni Inequality was used to adjust for pairwise 
error, resulting in an item-level probability of p<.002, while hdding the family-wise error 
rate at p<.05). Any ratio significantly difkrmt from 1 is considered evidence of 
stereotypy; therefore, this measure has produced considerable information as to stereotype 
content All ratios are listed in Table 7. In additirm, in Table 8, are the mean percentage 
estimates for the ten most extreme scores, ccsaq>aied to control group scores.
Item-level scores on the ;aejudice measure, cmce again, were quite negative; (xily 
one itan barety cleared the neutral mean, that score was in Study 1, in response to the 
question, "These people should keq> this information secret fiom health insurance 
con^xmies.” The score of 4.04 suggests that, in Shxty 1, subjects were sli^tty inclined to 
believe that the infimnation should be disclosed. That finding did not hold for Study 2, 
however (meaiF= 3.38), leavii% an interpretaticm of this finding unclear. It is possible that 
some subjects felt that withholding information fimn insurance companies would be 
fiaudulent Questions which garnered the most extreme scores are shown in Table 9.
QiiftlitAtive Peaiiltfl
The adjective checklist offered subjects an cptional, fiee-respcmse section in which 
to add descriptors. Thirty-nine subjects out of a pool of222 (17.56%) contributed a total 
of 75 additional adjectives. Responses ranged fixxm (Hie to four added descriptors. Four
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
78
TABLE 7: DIAGNOSTIC RATIO 
Item Ajoafyais 
A. CONTENTS OF THE NEGATIVE STEREOTYPE
Pwsons wfao se«k m*nW hwhh trertnwrt ch f c terized by » ü d ; of Üie foflowing tnâfa
STUDY l(N -74) snzBYiûfciie)
Mem Raho
degMit .56 .000 .79 NS
.66 .000 .72 .000
alert .69 NS .68 .000
bmppy .39 .000 .38 .000
.70 .000 1.17 NS
hard worker .60 .000 .66 .000
-very idigiMiS .73 .002 1.12 NS
mat .49 .000 .79 .000
kaAiooal .54 .000 .61 .000
e& iart .64 .000 .62 .000
sorhgfeated .72 NS .72 .000
ambiiiaas .65 .000 .55 .000
sexual .74 .000 .79 .000
B. CONTENTS OF THE POSITIVE STEREOTYPE
Persons who seA. menW health treahneot are dharactexized (y Ibe presence of 6 e  foOowing (nits
sn aaci (N̂ 74) 5iunY2.miiB
IdcHDLBdia probabilt̂
icaiy 2.16 .000 2.52 .000
dangeraos 2.35 .000 3.95 .000
nenrortc 3.29 .000 5.38 .000
paranoid 2.W .000 3.12 .000
artirtk 1.2 NS 1.75 .000
imsteble 3.54 .000 3.40 .000
trrattenal 2.86 ' .000 3.00 .000
odd 180 .000 3.09 .000
stopid 1.60 NS 2.51 .000
socially
inappropriate 3.43 .000 3.63 .000
craagr 3.42 .000 4.38 .000
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
79
C- NONSIŒ'nnCANT ADJECITVES
The (oOowm% tnils were not considcfcd p a t of any stereotype in aâter study of persoos who se«k mental K»*lrii
STUDY lOferTi) SIUPY2Q?=llt)
ADJECTIVE MmmXWb prabd& ty M#«iiteün grdtsM ssi
slrajgjhlfofwani .84 .201 1.06 .752
D.TRATTS RATED AS STEREOTYPICAL FOR THE CONTROL GROUP (N=27)
Afl Infe were aoiBigwficmt for <fae coated gyoinp.
NOTES: A^nstedfbrpainnseen«;itein4evd]i<.0(Q;&nii]y>wBe|t<.05 
B<4d pnot = Ten Most Extreme Scores
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TABLE 8: DIAGNOSTIC RATIO 
MostExtreme Scores 
with Control Group Comparison
M em  % Estimate M em  Ratio (% / base rate)
Xiait
(N=74)
Study 2 
(N=118)
Control
(N>=27)
Study 1 
(N=74)
Sturdy 2 
(N=ll«)
Control
(N=27)
Scaiy 51.39 54.90 22.59 2.16 2.52 .78
Inappropriate 52.47 57.99 23.63 3.43 3.63 1.05
Crazy 62.66 65.55 15.37 3.42 4.38 1.01
Dangerous • 52.31 56.56 19.74 2.35 3.95 1.15
Neurotic 61.28 66.36 26.96 3.29 5.38 1.42
Paranoid 60.54 64.06 44.19 2.88 3.13 1.58
Happy 23.16 18.86 55.37 .39 .38 1.23
Unstable 68.15 72.17 32.93 3.54 3.40 1.23
Irrational 62.69 64.68 30.59 2.86 2.92 .84
Odd 72.46 77.11 34.19 2.80 3.09 1.12
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TABLE 9: PREJUDICE MEASURE 
Most Extreme Scores 
with Cootxol Qioup Comparison
3 b. Thw» people should ke«p this information lecret fW>m «0 but dose frieads/fkmUy.
au4y l(N = 7»  Study2(N=12Q) CoDto>H>l=27>
3.09 2.S5 4.19
3c. These people should keep lUs faiforautloo secret from cmrent employcn.
Stu<jy 1 CN=75) Stlxjy2(N=119) Control (N=27)
3.64 2.86 4.11
3e. Zb^jM fllllesboald not w on^aiw at keeping tU staronsetioae secret MANY or MOST PEOPLE sraald:
Sta4y-L(N^5) St!K^y2(N=120) Control (N=27)
3.20 2.59 4.44
s. Xn # diroree, do you Alnk MANY or MOST people would eqiect the courts to grant custody of a child to one of
these people, assuming the other parent were equally fft?
Stwty 1 CN=75) Stin|y2CN=12Q) Control (N=27)
2.67 2.49 4.52
6. Do yon think MANY or MOST PEOPLE would be wtllfaig to hare the ontpaticnt d ink tfaaac peupla go to for
treatment in their neighborhood?
Study 1 <N=75) Study 2 (N=120) Control 0^=26)
2.97 2.94 4.42
7. Do you think tta t MANY or MOST PEOPLE would be willing to entrust the care their child(ren) to one of fluat
pcppk?
Study 1 (N=75) Study2_(N=120 Control (N=27)
2.16 1.85 4.56
10. How do you think MANY or MOST people would react to one of these people who was also:
b. a teacher?
Study 1 (N=74> Study2CN=120) Control (N=27)
2.72 2.37 4.59
c. a coimselor or therapist?
Study 1 (N=^4> Study 2 (N=120) Control CNt=27)
2.42 2.32 4.59
d. a dergy member or other rdigious person?
Study 1 (N=74) Study 2 (N=1201 Control (N=27>
2.69 2.63 4.78
NOTES: l=mo8t negative reqxmse; 4 = neutrd; 7=most poshive lesponse
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
82
individuals added aitire aentences or minor commentAnes. All results can be found in 
Table 10.
The negative tone of the qualitative answers was also reflected in responses to the 
manipulatiw check. For subjects who were unable to remember the exact cme-line 
desoiption of the judged group as given in their packet, their interpretations were routinefy 
negative. Some exanq>les include: "crazy people,” "unstable people,” "people vho were 
sexually abusive to others,” and "people y/bo other people think shouldn’t take care of 
duldren.”
Inter-Instrument Analyses 
In calculating conelatic»s for the adjective cfaeddist, (Mofy Checklist Negative 
sc<aes were used, since those scores represent the data of interest Coiielations between 
instruments in Studÿ 1 ranged from ~.24 to .60. Conelatians in S tu^ 2 raided fincxn -.07 
to .55. Two correlations in Study 2, both of vdiich involved the diagnostic ratio, failed to 
reach significance. Other correlations showed similar patterns to those sem in Study 1.
All results are reproduced in Table 11.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
83
TABLE 10: QUALITATIVE RESULTS 
Fiee-Respoose Option 
fiüm the ADJECTIVE CHECKLIST MEASURE
Study 1(N->102)
Comments
1 (Control) concerned, crmsideiate, aware, logical
1 (Control) weird
1 (ControO unsociable
1 (Control) cautious, smart, aware, caoscience[sic]
1 (Control) lower class
2 (1st appt) people-persoQ
3(1 YR) different
3(1 YR) weird, nutty, screwed-up
3(1 YR) weird, needs help
3(1 YR) depressed, quirky
4 (Mental^ ill) funny
4 (Mraxtalfy ill) easily pleased
4 (Mraitalfy ill) retarded
4 (Mraitally iU) strange, different, weird
4 (N/fentally ill) disturbed, poor, daanged, outlandish
4 (Mentally iU) dependent
Condition
5[CR]
5[CR]
5(CR]
Study 2 (N«120)
51CR]
5 ICR] 
5[CR]
6 [PR] 
6 [PR]
Commenta
nuts
womedy nervous
normal; 7 think there are mcmy people 
that go to psychologists fo r mcmy reasons 
and the majority o f people are very normal 
people ûust just need help clearing their 
heads I  dan't think the majority o f people 
in the world think any less o f someone for 
attending a psycJwhgist " 
weird
worthless, angry, hatefiil, psydiotic 
weak, loser
Ih e  person describe [sic] seem to be 
very withdrawn and unsociable. " 
incoherent, strange
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C em A itim Comments
6[PR]
61PR)
6{PR]
'«iiacko, nuts 
fieaky
'People who visitp^hologist general have 
some o f dijferentationfrom die )wrm '
or have personality problems etc. This 
makes people ÛtirÛL that dtese people are 
abnormal " [sicj
71CRND]
7[CRND]
7[CRim]
7(CRND]
8(PRND)
8(PRND)
8(PRND)
8[PRND]
lame, differœt 
stiange, weird, psychotic 
confused, helpless 
troublesome, reflective, unhappy
messy (out of wdes) 
shy, lonefy, helpless, empty 
misunderstood 
sad,misanble
9 [CRD] 
9 (CRD)
loso-, follower, desperate, psychotic 
duonic — "once ill always ilV’
10[PRD]
10[PRD]
crazy, out of ccmtrol, loc^, w ad^ 
stressed
COXDnK)NS:: lst#ppt=p*BOohma&A«ppL mApqfchokgisL 1 YR= ptfsoa has
bamsadasp^yclwlogislftrayaar. CR=%lmitfif«tnd;I'R=palMntnfcfi«d;CRNÈ>»dM(SnCiMNdlmtiiotaiagM»sad; 
raM >=pab«it rcftired bat not (Sagnmed; CRIWkm* refttred and dtagaosad; PRD=pa*i$at referred and diagnosed.
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TABLE 11 : CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 
INTER-INSTRUMENT ANALYSIS
----------------t/Arrjarjin i
CHECNEG
Stuify 1 (N=102) 
Study 2 (N=120) 
PREJUDICE
-.4919 (p= 000) 
-.4288 (p=.000)
-.5961 (p=.000) 
-.4486 (p=.000)
.3277 0=001) 
.1712 (p=.066)
Study 1 (N=102) 
Stuffy 2 (N=l 20) 
DTfFERElsmAL
.6000 (>=.000) 
.5503 0 =  000)
-.2350O=.020) 
-.0721 0=.442)
Stuffy J (N-I02) 
Study 2 (N=-nO)
-3180(p=.001) 
-.3239 (p=.000)
NOTES: ChecN^=Checldist N a tiv e  summaiy score. Pregudice==Prgudice Total. 
DifFetential=Diflfeieiitial Total DX Ratio=Ratio total.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
DISCUSSION
... ^m nc^p«nctanfysam tm uinabiuyltf»eotdisadtf«nsecfow rp<m iicn tnsoei4^, butundt 
toprêSTM usJrom aU ds b^irtkkrmg ifffectt ̂ trying toMte àie w orldstu ad ifyan d ttw h ok  
(L^^pmanm, 1922, p, 124).
These studies attenq)ted to expire several aspects of stereotypes which attend 
upon persons who seek mental health treatment, especially as those stereotypes are 
eiqpressed through preintw»ction expectanmes. The research procedure asked participants 
to describe, but not necessarily to endorse, social stereotypes. That procedure served in 
part to circumvent participants’ motivations to offer socialty desirable responses.
To that extent, the procedure appears to have been successful. Research on 
stereotyping usually must absorb a certain pacadage of sutgects who refuse to engage in 
the research task of categorizing others. In Üœ 1960’s, Karlins et al. (1969) reported a 
near-20% rate of refusal. However, no subject in either of the current studies refused to 
complete any aspect of any instrument, nor was there a single refusal among the 54 subjects 
in the pretesting subject pool. A handful of subjects did leave some items blank, but 
whether this was done deliberatety or through oversight is unclear. Accordirigty, it seems 
that either this was an unusually sophisticated group, wfao easily made the distinction 
between their personal beliefs and cultural prejudices, or an unusualty unsophisticated 
group, who were readily amenable to categorizing others. A third possibility is that, 
whereas stereotyping based on race or garder is no longer considered acceptable, 
stereotyping of the mentalty ill is still less socially proscribed.
86
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Study 1
Three inteicomiected l^potheses west examined in Study 1. The first hypothesis 
was that a cultural stereo^fpe does «dst vdikh describes the recipients of mental health 
care, and that participants are teadify able to describe the contents of that stereotype. 
Second, it was proposed that the stereotype differs significantty from a more general 
stereotype which desoibes recipients of other types of medical service. It was further 
hypotWsized, third, that the stereotype will differ dq>ending on the pwceived extent of 
contact with the mental health system, reflecting increasing stigma with greater contact. 
Therefore, the stereotype for persons with a "minimal” ot "intermediate” label should be 
more n a tiv e  than in the no-label (control) conditicm but less negative than in the "strong” 
label condition (in vMch the person is described as mentalty ill).
The first hypc^hesis was clearly suppwted. Subjects were able to provide ample 
data r%aiding stereotypes of people who seek mmtal health treatment. In foot, contrary to 
eqpectati(ms, subjects evidenced no besitatitm os confusicm r%aiding the research task. A 
notable minority of subjects (17.56%) also provided a total of 75+ additional adjectives in 
the fiee-iesponse opti(XL That number is comidesab\y higher than the 14 adjectives 
contributed by Katz & Braty s (1933) original subject pool (N=100), underscoring again 
that subjects were certainty not at a loss fixr stereotyped deswptors.
Itypothesis 2 was siqqxxted, with one exception. In general, the adjectives used to 
describe perscms seeing a p^chrdogist (conditi<ms 2, 3 & 4) diffared significantty fiom 
fliose used to describe a ccmtrol group of posons vho had an appointment with a family 
physician. However, one of the fimr instruments, the diagnostic ratio, did provide slightty
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different results. On the ratio measure, only the strong label condition (condition 4: 
"noentalfyiU’O differed significant^ from the control group. Differences regarding this 
measure will be discussed later.
The third hypothesis in Study 1 received onfypaitial siqiport. A linear effect was 
hypothesized, such that the degree of negativity of the stereotype would positively covaiy 
with the ing>lied severity of label. A stronger label, suggesting more prolonged contact 
with the mental health system, would theoretically cany a greater stigma and therefore 
elicit a more n^ative stereotype. Somevdiat suq^ingty, however, this effect was not 
found. In feet, there were little or no distinctions made, any instrument, betwe^ any of 
the labeled ccmditions othK than the control group. The stereotype of the "mantalty iU” 
differed not at all fiom the stereotype of people with a first ̂ ^ in tm ent with a 
psydiologjst. The cat^odzation here, then, seems to be lath^ ligidty dichotœnous: either 
people are nonnal, or th ^  are abnormal. There are no shades of gray, in terms of the 
attendant social ju<%ment. It is interesting to note at this point that the majority of initial 
psychiatric consultations are via primary care physicians, rathw than through the more 
specialized (and potentially more effective) mental health i^stem. That feet should not be 
surprising in l i ^  of these data. People who see their fiunity physician are still considered 
mentalty well, wfaüe those who make ev ^  a single visit to a psychologist may place 
theinsetves at risk fer the taiiit of rnental illiiess.
Shirty 2
Those people who do choose to consult a psycholr^st, do so within settii%s 
defined by the medical model. The second study addressed whether medical terminology
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itself might initiate or exacerbate the processes under scrutiny, that is, v&ether it might 
function as a stimulus to sterootyph%. In such a context, difficulties become disease, and 
that paradigm itself could contribute entire sets of in^tive preinteraction expectancies. 
Study 2 predicted main efifects similar to the last hypothesis of Stucfy 1, namely, that 
extremity of n a tiv e  evaluation would increase as peeeived contact with the mental 
health system increased, ha other words, in Study 2, the more "patient-lilœ" ffie pason 
described, the more stigma would be attached. However, as in the first stucty, the 
predicted effect did not materialize. The factorial ANOVA in Stu(ty 2 was statisticalty 
nonsignificant
Several explanations are possible for the lack of results. Most obvious, of course, 
is that the prranise is flawed. Perhaps medical terminol(%y sinpty plays no role in the 
elicitation of mental lUness stereotypes. However, although the literature is unclear 
concmiing the role of medical model t^nminology, a significant thecaetical tradition, 
especially among feminist writers, does describe differential reactions to the use of 
medical jargon. For exanple, some femiiiist therapists eschew corrpletely the 
n^dical/psyclKxlogicai tradition of diagnosis. They believe that inherent in the medical 
model is a fundamental power imbalance which devalues the client and the client’s 
eapaience in fevor of the (allegec^ expertise of the therapist (Butler, 1985; ChesW, 1976; 
Gilbert, 1980; Greenspan, 1986; Lerman, 1985; Sturdivant, 1980). In this view, traditional 
processes of medical or mental health evaluation also isolate the client firran the context in 
vdiich she or he lives. As a result, the evaluative process defines difficulties as 
necessaiify and onfy intrapsychic, rather than considering the interpersonal, familial.
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socW, and/w cultural ioflueuoes which may be e<piaUy important (C^lan, 1988; Chesler, 
1976; Rosewater, 1988). Feminist practitionas point to the sorts of oqiectancies 
reviewed earli^-for exanq>le, that mental health treatment is indicative of a M ure of the 
person-^)» one result of sudr a narrow medical view; and they note that the expectancies 
unbodied by medical terminology are often destructive and stigmatizing (Blake, 1973; 
Franks, 1986; Gilbert, 1980; Lerman, 1985; Rosewater, 1988; Sturdivant, 1980). Since 
this thew^cal tradition has now endured 6xr at least two decades, it would jHobably be 
premature at this point to reject the hypothesis that medical terminology may contribute to 
the elicitation of stereotypes.
Another possible e^lanation for the lack of results in Stucly 2 lies with the subtlety 
ofthestu^desig[L hi this second study, differences in ccmditions were often only a single 
word. That om  word must have been sali«it enot%h to participants to elicit s^nificantty 
difiènent responses. Participants simpfy have M ed to attmd closely to those 
distioctimis. It is also possible that a largw sample size would be necessary to achieve 
significance, and that the same design with a larger participant population would yield the 
eqiected distincticHis.
Such potmtial flaws of design or theory aside, an alternative explanation also 
presents itself It is possible that the very idea of mental health treatment is atready 
perceived as a medical interventicHL Terms sudh as "referral," "treatment," and 
"psychologist” are largety medical terms; and indeed, our entire Western approach is 
(currently) based (m a biomedical model. Therefore, subjects may already have been 
socialized to consider help-seddng in illness/recoveiy terms, making the manipulation
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essentially redundant Pexhaps using a word like "client” to provide a more consumer 
connotation 8inq>fy isn’t efifective, given a cultural context which tends to view all health 
care as medicalized.
However, the most pessimistic interpretation of the data firom Study 2, in vhich no 
distinctions whatsoever are made between various dĉ prees of contact with the mentaï 
health system, is that the stigma attadbed to such contact is still so entrenched that it 
becanes a "master status” against vddch all other descriptors pale. This interixetation is 
consistent with the results from Study 1. From the very first contact with psychological 
services-indeed, even before such contact, with the mere referral to mental health 
treatment-persoos arejudged in ̂ foundly socially n^ative terms. They are seen through 
the lens of their cultuially-expected deficits: as unstable, unhappy, uofiiendfy, and unusual. 
That stereotype is elicited despite subjects having no other information about the persons 
they were judging, such as gender, problem or diagnosis, ethnicity, family background, or 
type of en^loyment, for example. A further e^qplmation of this premise will be discussed 
Anther below.
Methodological Analyses 
As noted previous^, a multi-method procedure was used in both studies. To help 
determine the rehalnli^ and validity of the instruments used, correlatimis between the 
summary semes fm each instrument, within each study, were calculated. Of special 
interest was the degree of correlation between the three more established instruments, 
which have research histories ranging fiom 25 to over 60 years (the adjective checklist, 
semantic difierential, and diagnostic ratio), and the newly-devised prejudice measure.
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which had its first research trial in these studies. The correlation coefficients betwem the 
pngudice measure arhd the other instruments were general^ rewarding. Most woe 
significant, averaging -.46 with the semantic dififerential and -.52 for the adjective 
checklist. (Correlations in the current studies are negative for both the sanantic 
differential and the prejudice measure due to the recoding procedure vduch assigned lower 
scores to more negative traits). Correlations with the diagnostic ratio were more 
disappointing, aven^ng only .15. hi general, however, the outlook a]^)ears prcanising for 
the prejudice instrument. Further research will be necessary to evaluate its utility m ae 
fully.
Other inta-instrument ccaielatioiis in both studies conq>ared fiivorabfy with earlia 
analyses reported in the literature, despite slight methodological variations. It wiU be 
recalled that the adjective cdiecklist was assigned three summary scores, and that 
correlations between the cheddist and the other instruments were calculated using only the 
summary score from negativefy-valenced adjectives (Checklist Negative). Débite this 
diange from previous w < ^  in which a sii%le summary seme is ̂ ^acally used, 
correlations between the adjective checklist and the semantic diffiaential ranged from -.45 
to -.60, akin to the .44 and ,87 coefficients found by Gardner et al. (1972).
Also consistent with the earlier literature, correlations using the ratio measure 
fftndftd to be lower and more uneven (McCauley & Stitt, 1978). A number of foctors may 
have cmatxibuted to the uneven performance of the diagnostic ratio in the current studies. 
Most obvious, of course, is that the diagnostic ratio solicits information foat is slightly 
different from the information elicited by the other instruments. Onfy with the ratio
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measure is the data comparative in nature. All other instruments ask for a single response, 
vi&ether dichotomized (yes/oo) or scaled (Likert-type scale). The diagnostic ratio, 
however, asks for an mitiAl response followed by a second, comparative assessment in 
vhich subjects must offer a base rate estimate as well. Perhaps that fact somehow elicits 
significantly different cognitive/emotional responses fiom subjects. In fact, as sample size 
increased, scores on the ratio measure became more, rather than less, divagent. It was in 
Study 2 (N=120) that the ratio measure failed to correlate significantly with either the 
prejudice measure or the adjective checklist.
A second fi&ctw may also have influenced the scores on the diagnostic ratio in the 
present studies. Of all of the instruments, it is possible that the diagnostic ratio was 
esqpecialfy sensitive to some adolescent angst-or perhaps some early cynicism—among the 
subjects, the vast majmity of ̂ o m  w ae IS'25 years old. For exanqple, a significant 
prpportimi of subjects estimated surprisingly high population base rates for a variety of 
negative traits. When averaged across all ccxrditions in both studies, mean bme rate 
estimates hovered near one-third firr all of the foUowing adjectives: "scary” (32%);
"stupid” (31%); "socialty inappropriate” (29%); "cara:^ (26%); "neurotic” (29%); "odd” 
(41%); "paranoid” (32%); "unstable” (30%); "dangerous” (30%); and "irrational” (34%). 
Conversety, subjects estimated that onty slightty more than half of the U.S. population were 
happy (58%), ambitious (57%), or intelligent (60%), and less than half the population 
were judged to be stra^tforward (47%). It is possible that such responses are atypical 
and are reflective of the developmental stage of the study participants. If such is the case.
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it would have served to diffeteoitiate the diagnostic ratio measure fiom the other 
mstmmmts, producing lower correlation coefficients.
General Comments 
Despite the aforementioned methodological vagaries, anqple data describing 
various stereotypes were provided by subjects in both studies. However, the format of the 
research also allowed participants to disavow their support of those stereotypes. What 
conclusions, then, can be drawn from those data? Sinq>ly, we can craiclude that even if 
particQMnts disavow the more negative or disparaging aspects of stereotypes at a 
conscious cognitive level, they may be influenced by them ncmetheless.
The social psydK>logical literature has onty just b ^ m  to search for answers to the 
recalcitrant disjunctions between belief, behavior, and affect. Robust correlations among 
those conqp<ments are rare. If we understand sraneone’s attitude, we still cannot laedict 
their actinos with any certainty, or vice versa. Especially in terms of basic expectancies 
such as stereotypes, one possible e:q)lanation is that a reasoned or consideed reqwnse is 
mrae likely the end than the beginning of a complex cognitive process. Prior to verbal or 
written expression of a belief, extrenety rapid cognitive mechanisms have alreaty sorted, 
categcrized, evaluated, and associated Üie stimulus to a variety of other descriptors.
Mudi, if not most, of that srarting process takes place without the conscious 
awareness of the individual. Basic cognitive schemata influence the percevrions of others 
by guiding the organization and classification of incoming data, and by directing attention 
dififerentialty to certain aspects of a stimulus at the expaise of other aspects. The research 
data unconscious processes highlight the central role of evaluation in peicqrion.
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Labels and cat^ories cannot be separated from their evaluative connotations. To 
emphasize a central point of this research, to label is to judge. A label is a cognitive 
package vhich conqnesses within itself an array of frets, opinions, beliefs, descriptions, 
and expectaticns. Whrai those conq>lex cognitive sets are shared by an entire group or 
culture, tfa^ are known as social or consensual stereotypes. Indeed, that participants can 
provide considerable detail about the contents of various stereotypes is aiqple evidence 
that they have been exposed to those stereotypes, and that th ^  have processed them, stored 
them, and can retrieve them with mmimal effort.
The debate continues over vhether stereotypes are inherently detrim^tal to those 
so categorized, or whether-per the "kernel of truth” hypothesis—stereotypes are more or 
less accurate reflections of reality. Jones & Cochrane (1981) atteoopted to assess whether 
"any stereotype vhich exists is in fact an accurate description of the behaviw of the 
mentalty ill, w is based rqx>n myth** (p. 99). They ccmcluded that the stereotype is 
"leasonabty accurate** since it "does not dififer significantty fiom how mental patients [sic] 
have been observed to behave** (p. 104). The stereotype, they noted, included traits which 
ovwlapped with diagnostic synptomatology, such as withdrawn, perplexed, and 
emotional.
Those arguing for the pemirtiousness of stereotypes note that axy stereotype, by 
definition, is both selective and oveigeneralized. Stoeotypes negate individual 
differences within the stereotyped group and funnel attention cmty toward certain, oftai 
negative, characteristics at the expense of a more balanced perspective. The stereotypes of 
the mentalty ill, and apparentty of those vho seek briefer treatment as well, rarely take
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account of their personal or collective strengths (Witztum et al., 1992). Even if accurate, 
stereotypes at best are incompl^, " a simplified diagram, not so different in principle and 
in veracity fiom the parallelogram with l%s and head in a child’s drawing of a 
CQnq>licated cow” (Lippmaxm, 1922, p. 116-117).
Even more to the point, stereotype, as indicated earlier, are part and parcel of any 
culture. At issue are not the individuals themselves, but as Rosenhan noted, "the role of 
context” (Rosenhan, 1975, p. 463) in wfaidb those individuals fimctiraL When any 
stereotype is well-known ot salient in a given culture, all numbers of that culture are 
inescapably affected. They react to the eiqpectatioas inherent in the stereotype in various, 
and sometimes in subtle, ways. A lifetime of acculturation cannot be annulled, even with 
the most well-intentioned efforts. Ihwapists are affected by stereotypes of the mentally ill 
vAxssi th^r confient their clients, and those clients are likewise personally affected fiom the 
moment they first contemplate seeking mental health treatment. Those beliefs, then-tbose 
same cultural expectancies—may affect health care choices not onty on the individual level, 
but at the community and social level as well, in terms of vho seeks treatment, vhat 
treatments are available, how that treatment is uncferstood and evaluated, and vhether the 
use of such treatment is smqx>rted or discouraged. Cultural e}q>ectancies may also 
influence who become practitioners in the area of mental health, how they nnplemait their 
particular health care function, to whom they ofibr their services, and how they view the 
recipients of those services, their clients (Kleinman, 1980). And of course, such beliefs 
infiamed by shared cultural socialization likety affect the therapeutic transaction and 
th^fore the outcome of psychotherapeutic treatment.
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CONCLUSION
To summarize, this research like any other rests its integrity on the underpinnings of 
theory. The theories tested here stem from past investigation fay decades of psychologists 
in a variety of specialties. Those thewies have been synthesized into two, frdrfy simple, 
studies vhich nevertheless rest on vety conq>lex constructs and principles whidi can be 
difficult to graille with. Stereotypes and labels play a role in every human interaction, 
from the most casual to the most important, and from the most informal to the most 
professional. "Attempts at debiasing other types of errors in judgment have...enq>hasized 
the impwtance of education with respect to the existence and nature of the bias and 
methods fay which to avoid the bias’* (Neuberg & Fiske, 1987, p. 442).
Given fbese data, a strong bias against mental health treatment still current^ exists. 
If, as previous research suggests, social stereotypes become applicable at the moment 
when the stereotyped situatitm becomes perscmalty relevant, tk n  an individual ccmsidering 
mmtal health treatment is immediately confronted with the force of perceived social 
ju(%ment. Ihose social juc^pments then beconœ a factor in aU future decision-making. A 
recait survey of over 20,000 Americans indicated that 25% of them-52 million people- 
had a diagnosable paydtiological disorder (Goleman, 1993). Of those millicms, only 28% 
sought any kind of assistance, and of that «tnaïï percentage, less than half (40%) ever 
consulted a mental health professional. Ctmsiderable mental health costs can be saved fay 
earlier identification and treatment of those in need of psychological help. However, it 
would appear that a preventicxi model of memW health has a serous public relations
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problem. Unless greater efforts are made to attaid to "the existence and nature of the bias” 
(Neubetg & Fiske, 1987, p. 442), it seems likely that psychological treatment will continue 
to be seal as the last resort of the deviant and the damned (Rotaibarg, 1978).
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APPENDIX A: 
ADJECTIVE CHECKLIST MEASURE
99
All of the following questions are about people %»&o [independent variable].
Consider the people described in the line above. Then check those adjectives 
below wfaidi you think MANY <x MOST people in our society would use to describe 
these people. Use the enq>ty space at the bottom to ADD any adjectives that you feel are 
important <x useful in describing these people. REMEMBER: your answers need not 
reflect your phonal feelings. You are cxafydaoKmstiating your knowledge of general 
stereotypes.
Stupid fluthful
quarrelsome withdrawn
pleasure-loving outgoing
individualistic unfliendlv
unstaWe effici^t
intelligent ignorant
treacherous evasive
vengeful over-eater
sexual h&ppy
irresponsible practical
showy talkative
insecure scary
loner radical
good sport traditional
imaginative unreliable
analytical superstitious
cowardly lilres to start fights
stoic carefiee
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.progressive 
_ dangerous 
_ meditative 
. suspcious 
ambitious 
irrational
100
 miserly
 aggressive
 neurotic
 pbysicallydirty
 crazy
 forgetful
 boastful
 conceited
—  sty 
_  shrewd 
_  alert
_ conventional 
_ elegant 
.naive 
_ unsuccessfbl 
.odd
. sophisticated
hard worker
_ dishonest 
.poorly dressed
_ boring 
.methodical 
.kind 
gezœrrais
 loud
  ^%ry religious
 paranoid
 .passionate
 agitated
 imitative
 h a y
 mçïulsiv©
 perverted
 arrogant
 nationalistic
_  loyal
— socially inappropriate 
__ fonatical 
_  straightforward 
_ argumentative 
_ materialistic 
.  9uick-tempered 
.witty 
.rude
. foroify-oriented 
courteous 
stubborn
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 suggestible
 quiet
 cruel
— humwless
 neat
  persistent
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artistic ____ sensitive
selfish ■ (xmservative
USE THIS SPACE TO ADD ANY ADJECTTVES YOU WISH
Please elabcsate on the sterootypes you axe describing by adding aiy additional words
here:
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APPENDIX A:
ADJECnVE CHECKLIST 
AHHttional Instm ction» fhr Pre-Tegtmg
Please lode back over the items you have diecked the preceding pages. NOW, 
go back and put a star (*) by the TEN (10) traits you think MANY or MOST peq[>le would 
consid^ to be MOST TYPICAL of peqple i^ o  are mentalfy iU.
Look again at the entire list of adjectives on the diecklist. Out of aU 100 
adjectives, place a cross (+) next to the TEN (10) traits you think MANY or MOST people 
in our society would consider to be LEAST TYPICAL of people v to  are mmtally ill.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
103
APPENDIX A:
REVISIONS TO THE ORIGINAL 
KATZ & BRALY (1933) ADJECTIVE CHECKLIST
Revisions wexe made for one of three reasons:
(a) either the texm seemed outmoded or was no longer in common use, and was iqxlated.
(b) the term was replaced one which was deemed easier to undastand.
(c) the term was redundant with another item already included, and was removed.
The changes are listed below:
Original last
scientificaUy'minded
brilliant
musical
industrious
grasping
mercenary
revengeful
gluttonous
pugnacious
suave
slovenfy
reserved
ponderous
stolid
sensual
jovial
happy-go-lucky
j&ivolous
gregarious
Current List
analytical
intelligent
artistic
hard worker
misaly
selfish
vengeful
over-eater
likes to start fights
elegant
poorly dressed
withdrawn
borh%
stoic
sexual
happy
carefiee
irresponsible
outgoing
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sportsmanlike good sport
tradition-loving traditional
^ctremely nationalistic nationalistic
loyal to fomify ties loyal & &mily-
oiiented
dangerous
Notice that "loyal to 6mily ties” was replaced by two dififerent adjectives—loyal and 
family-OTienled--to capture the dual facets of the term. A final word, "dangerous,” was 
added to round out the list. This particular adjective was selected because the literature is 
equivocal concerning the endorsement of this particular characteristic as it relates to the 
mentally ill.
ADDITIONS TO THE KATZ & BRALY CHECKLIST
The following adjectives were generated during an mtroductory psychology class
discussion and were added to those listed above to make a total of 100 adjectives on the
conq>leted checklist:
perverted
crazy
foigetfiil
irrational
unfiriendly
scary
unsuccessful
agitated
unstable
socially inappropriate 
sexual
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loner
fanatical
neurotic
odd
paranoid
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APPENDIX B:
SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL MEASURE
Below are lists of opposites. In between are nmnbos from 1 to 7. Each number represents 
the am ount or degree of the particular trait at each aid. Please reflect on the pec^le described in 
the line below, and then circle om number for pair that you think MANY or MOST people in
our society would use to describe those peqple MOST CLOSELY.
For exanqple, the first pair consists of "outgoii^” at one end and "withdrawn” at the other. 
If you tbou^t the stereo^pe for the people below included the idea that these pecple are extranely 
outgoing, you might circle a 1. If you thoi%ht that most people would omsider them neither 
outgoing nor withdrawn, you might circle a 4, in the middle of tit» two traits. If you wanted to 
indicate that most people would cmasidw these people somewhat withdrawn, you might circle a 5 
or 6. 7 would n^nes^t extremely withdrawn, the opposite of a 1.
Be sure to make (me choice f(X' EVERY pair. Please do not mark in between spaces; you 
must choose WHOLE NUMBERS. You should have a total of 40 responses.
You are describing people who [independent variable]
1. outgoing 1 2 3 5 6 7 withdrawn
2. uxperplexed 1 2 3 5 6 7 perpleiœd
3. unemotional 1 2 3 5 6 7 emoticmal
4. tense 1 2 3 5 6 7 relaxed
5. happy 1 2 3 5 6 7 sad
6. irrational 1 2 3 5 6 7 rational
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7. enthusiastic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unenthusiastic
S. nonviolmt 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 violent
9. suspicious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unsuspicious
10. nonsuicidal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 suicidal
11. sociable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unsociable
12. boring 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 interesting
13. strong 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 weak
14. passive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 active
15. excitable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 calm
16. détendent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 indep^dent
17. understandable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 confusing
18. lehaWe 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unreliable
19. pessimistic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 c^timistic
20. uncoopaative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 cooperative
21. healthy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 sick
22. unusual 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 usual
23. sophisticated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 naive
24. lazy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 industrious
25. proud 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 humble
26. ccHnmumcative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 uraxMnmunicative
27. sensitive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 insensitive
28. tolerant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 intolerant
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29. miinfoixiied 1 2 3 5 6 7 informed
30. colorless 1 2 3 5 6 7 colorful
31. Air 1 2 3 5 6 7 un&ir
32. restrictive 1 2 3 5 6 7 permissive
33. masculine I 2 3 5 6 7 feminine
34. generous 1 2 3 5 6 7 stingy
35. uiq>leasaiit 1 2 3 5 6 7 pleasant
36. nanow-mm(ted 1 2 3 5 6 7 open-minded
37. good-natured 1 2 3 5 6 7 bad-natured
38. dqpmdable 1 2 3 5 6 7 undq)Mkdable
39. cowardly 1 2 3 5 6 7 brave
40. sane 1 2 3 5 6 7 insane
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APPENDIX B:
COMPONENTS OF THE SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL 
Used in this Study
A. From the difierential used by Jones & Coduane (1981):
1 The ten "psychiatric” adjective pairs are listed below.
outgoing-withdrawn
peq)lexed-ui4 )aplexed
«notional-unemotional
tense-relaxed
happy-sad
rational-irrational
enthusiastic-unenthusiastic
violent-nonviolent
suspicious-unsuspicious
suicidal-ncmsuicidal
2. The following adjectives, uhich were original^ drawn from assessments of ethnic 
stereotypes, were also included, in order to avoid unduly biasing lists in the direction of a 
priori assumptions:
industrious-lazy
proud-humble
communicative-uncommunicative
sensitive-insensitive
tolerant-intolerant
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colorful-colorless
^ir-uoAdf
peimissive-iestrictive
masculine-femintue
geuefous-süiigy
pleasant-uDpleasaiü
nanow-minded'K^jeD-minded
good natuied - bad natuied
dependable-undependable
brave-cowardly
3. Four pairs below were dropped as being either redundant or not dixectb̂  relevant:
extiavagant-thiiAy
advanced-backward
cooperative-uncooperative
initableHcahn
4. Two pairs ware changed:
just-unjust (replaced with hiir-un&ir) 
infcMrmed-ignorant (replaced with infimned-uninkrme^
B. From the differential used ly  Wallston et al. (1976):
1. The pairs listed below were used in this stucfy. 
sociable-unsociable 
interesting-boring
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stmng-weak
active-passive
eKcitable-calm
miderstandable-coofusing
reliable-unreliable
optintistic-pessimistic
cooperative-uncooperative
l»althy-sick
usual-unusual
sophisticated-naive
2. Ibe following five pairs w%e dropped as being either redundant, not directly 
relevant, or overty simplistic:
good-bad
nice-awful
large-small
fiist-slow
3. One pair was chaiiged:
self-reliant-dependent (rplaced with indepaadent-dependent)
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APPENDIX C:
DIAGNOSTIC RATIO MEASURE
Consider the people described in the line below. Think of all the people in our culture 
who fit that description. Of ALL of these people, what pereentage do you think actually 
possesses each of the traits listed below? Remember that you are answaing the way you 
think MANY of MOST people in our society would answer, that is, you are describing the 
general stereotype.
So, for example, if the pe<^le described below were "lawyers,” and the adjective was 
"exciting,” you would estimate vhat percentage of lawyers MANY or MOST people in our 
society think are exciting. If you think people believe that most lawyers are exciting, then 
you might guess 90%. That would mean that, within our cultural stereotype, about 90% of 
lawyers would be considered exciting. If, on the other hand, you think that MOST people 
in our society believe lawyers to be boring, then you would probably say that only a small 
number are exdting. Perimps you would guess 10%.
So, first, for each of the 20 traits listed below, estimate the percentage of such persons 
who possess that particular trait.
You are evaluating people who [independent variable]
Next, look at each adjective again and estimate the number of ALL people in our 
culture vriio possess thia particular trait, in the view of MANY of MOST people. In otlwr 
words, you are now evaluating everyone, NOT just the person described in your packet.
For each of the 20 traits listed below, estimate the percentage of ALL people in the 
United States who possess that particular trait.
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]hûl % of people ia thia % of ATJ.peryift
or pflrtiailftTgmiqt in the U.S.
A4iective who possess this trait who P âtieag this trait
1. scaiy_______________________  _________
2. very religious _________  _________
3. efficient _________  _________
4. sophisticated _________  _________
5. stiqnd _________  _________
6. socially ina{^>iopriate _________  _________
7. ambitious _________  _________
8. sexual _________  _________
9. craQ  ̂ _________  _________
10. eluant___________ _________  _________
11.dangerous_________ _________  _________
12. neurotic__________ _________  _________
13. witty______________________  _________
14. alot_____________ _________  _________
15. hqxpy____________ ______ _ _________
16. intelligent_________ _________  _________
17. paranoid__________ _________  ________
18. artistic___________ _________  _________
19. hard woiker_______ _________  _________
20. unstable _________  _________
21. iwsat _________  _________
22. irrational _________  _________
23. straightfbrwaid _________  _________
24. traditional _________  _________
25. odd _________  _________
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APPENDIX D:
PREJUDICE MEASURE
ALL of the foUowmg questioos aie about people viho [mdependeot variable]. You
will be asked about MANY or MOST PEOPLE’S reactions to, and feelings about, IhfiSfi
people. In ofeer words, you must evaluate how you think the of people would
view such people.
Please CIRCLE the number below which reflects the opinion you think MANY or 
MOST PF.OPTE in our society would hold about these people. REMEMBER; your 
answers do osl need to match your own personal opinirxis. You are only danonstrating 
your knowIe<%e of general stereotypes.
1. Persrm A is one of these pgcŷ lfi who has been flkmds with P ^ o n  B for a long time.
a. To what extent do you think MANY or MOST PEOPLE would expect their 
fliaidship to change, given the new information about Person A?
ftot nentnl ve*y
stafl mncb
b. If you think MANY or MOST PEOPLE would expect it to change, in which diiectioa do 
you think MANY or MOST PEOPLE would expect it to change? For the better or fer the 
worse, in general?
voy nm tnl very
«m mpk m u c h
worse better
2. Do you tfaink MANY or MOST PEOPLE would want one of thssfi people for a fidend?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
JfCnitely nentnl dr finitely
not yes
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3. How do you think MANY or MOST PEOPLE would respond to the following 
statements?
a These people should keq> this infomnation secret from eveiyone. MANY or MOST 
PEOPLE would:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ve*y Dciitnl very
saonrtr stroq^
b. These people should keq> this intimation secret fiom aU but close fiiüda/fomily. 
MANY or MOST PEOPLE would:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
very an itn l very
stmngb straoib
disapee «pee
c. These people should keep this infoimation secret fircan current en^lqyers. MANY 
or MOST PEOPLE would:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
very aeutnl veiy
strong^ strongly
d. These people should keq> this information seœ t from health insurance companies. 
MANY or MOST PEOPLE would:
very neutni voy
stram^
dmpee apee
e. These pecple should not wony about keeping this information a secret. MANY or 
MOST PEOPLE would:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
■wiy aeutnl '« y
strooĝ  itraa^
disjpee agnc
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4. Do you think MANY or MOST people would ucpect a landlord to rent to theaA 
assuming the landlwd knew about this information?
imSnl dcfinil̂
not yt3
5. In a divorce, do you think MANY or MOST people would expect the courts to grant 
custotfy of a diild to one of these assuming the otho’ parent were equalfy fit?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
defimt̂ r neulnl
yes
6. Do you think MANY or MOST PEOPLE would be willing to have the outpatient clinic 
these people go to for treatmaU in their nmghborhood?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
definitely nentnl defimtdy
not wiBimg
snUma
7. Do you think that MANY or MOST PEOPLE would be wiling to entrust the care their 
<Aild(ren) to one of these people?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
definitely neotiW definitely
not wiUè%
8. Do you think MANY or MOST PEOPLE would mind if their son/daughtar were dating 
erne of these people?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
definite^ nentnl definit^y
not yes
9. Do you think MANY or MOST PEOPLE would mind if their son/dai^hter intended to 
many one of I h ^  people?
nentnl definitely
not yes
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10. How do you think MANY or MOST PEOPLE would react to one of ttieaa people v to  
was also: 
a. a parent?
1
voy
nagfoMfy
b. a teacher?
4
ocnttal
7
vwy
pos*v^
v w y
7
vtiy
poâüwly
c. a counselor or ther^st?
1 2 3
very
megetkdy
4
acotrtl
d. a clergy member or other lel^ous pers<m?
2 31
very
negeüv^
4
neutral
7
veiy
positively
7
v a y
11. Do you think MANY or MOST PEOPLE would be willing to make a charitable 
donation, or to pay increased taiœs in order to support these people's treatment, if he or she 
could not afford it?
dcfiniidy
n o t
4
oeutnl definitê
yet
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